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CRIMINALIZING COERCIVE CONTROL
WITHIN THE LIMITS OF DUE PROCESS
ERIN SHELEY†
ABSTRACT
The sociological literature on domestic abuse shows that it is more
complex than a series of physical assaults. Abusers use “coercive
control” to subjugate their partners through a web of threats,
humiliation, isolation, and demands. The presence of coercive control is
highly predictive of future physical violence and is, in and of itself, also
a violation of the victim’s liberty and dignity. In response to these new
understandings the United Kingdom has recently criminalized
nonviolent coercive control, making it illegal to, on two or more
occasions, cause “serious alarm or distress” to an intimate partner that
has a “substantial effect” on their “day-to-day activities.” Such a vaguely
drafted criminal statute would raise insurmountable due process
problems under the U.S. Constitution.
Should the states wish to address the gravity of the harms of coercive
control, however, this Article proposes an alternative statutory
approach. It argues that a state legislature could combine the due process
limits of traditionally enterprise-related offenses such as fraud and
conspiracy with the goals of domestic abuse prevention to create a new
offense based upon the fraud-like nature of coercively controlling
behavior. It argues that the most useful legal framework for defining
coercive control is similar to that of common law fraud, and that
legislatures should adapt the scienter requirements of fraud to the actus
reus of coercive control. In so doing, this Article also argues that it is
risky for legislatures to punish gender-correlated offenses with
specialized legal solutions, rather than recognizing the interrelationship
between such offenses and other well-established crimes.

Copyright © 2021 Erin Sheley.
† Associate Professor, California Western School of Law. Many thanks to Caroline
Davidson, James Lindgren, and Jenia Iontcheva Turner for their immensely helpful comments on
earlier drafts of this paper.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2010, British mother Sally Challen killed her husband Richard
with a hammer.1 After a trial in which the prosecution depicted her as
a jealous wife, angry over his extramarital affairs, Sally was convicted
of murder.2 But the couple’s son David had an entirely different
perspective on their marriage. Richard, David said, “bullied and
humiliated” Sally, “isolated her from her friends and family, controlled
who she could socialise with, controlled her money, restricted her
movement and created a culture of fear and dependency.”3 Richard
convinced Sally that the abuse she was suffering was normal.4
Furthermore, while tightly restricting his wife’s behavior, Richard had
repeated affairs, visited brothels, and, when Sally challenged him, “he
would gaslight her, make her question her sanity” and tell the couple’s
children she was “mad.”5
Eventually, a judge agreed with David. After Sally had served
eight years of her murder sentence, a court quashed her conviction on
the grounds that at the time of the offense Sally was suffering from a
psychological “adjustment disorder” brought on by the forty years of
mental abuse and control Richard had inflicted on her.6 She pleaded
guilty to manslaughter and was sentenced to time served.7
Sally’s release coincides with a moment of intense British legal and
cultural attention to the form of interpersonal abuse known as
“coercive control.” Popularized by American forensic social worker
Evan Stark, the term “coercive control” refers to a pattern of abusive
behavior perpetrated against intimate partners through threats, rage,
orders, and demands to gradually strip away their autonomy, isolate

1. Ciara Nugent, ‘Abuse Is a Pattern.’ Why These Nations Took the Lead in Criminalizing
Controlling Behavior in Relationships, TIME (June 21, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://time.com5610016/
coercive-control-domestic-violence [https://perma.cc/5MNF-5YT4].
2. Id.
3. David Challen, My Mother, Sally Challen, Was Branded a Cold-Blooded Killer. At Last She
Has Justice, GUARDIAN (June 8, 2019, 11:17 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/society/2019/jun/
08/my-mother-sally-challen-killed-my-father-finally-justice [https://perma.cc/2VPM-AEVM].
4. See id.
5. Id.
6. See Nugent, supra note 1 (citing the cause of Challen’s “adjustment disorder” as “decades
of coercive control by her husband”).
7. See id.

SHELEY IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1324

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

2/23/2021 9:06 PM

[Vol. 70:1321

them from systems of social support, and microregulate the day-to-day
affairs of their lives.8
Stark, who testified on Sally Challen’s behalf, argues that the
effort made in the 1990s by social workers, advocates, lawyers, and
legislatures to recognize domestic violence as a crime, as opposed to
merely a personal matter, missed part of the point.9 “From the first
woman we had in our [Connecticut] shelter, they were telling us
violence wasn’t the worst part,” Stark told Time magazine, “but all we
could think to say [in order to obtain restraining orders] was ‘Tell
people about the violence’ . . . . It took us 30 years to realize there was
another way.”10 Thus, he argues, the now-widely recognized
phenomenon of Battered Woman Syndrome only tells part of the story.
Domestic abuse may, in fact, be more like kidnapping or indentured
8. See generally EVAN STARK, COERCIVE CONTROL: HOW MEN ENTRAP WOMEN IN
PERSONAL LIFE 5 (2007) (“Like hostages, victims of coercive control are frequently deprived of
money, food, access to communication or transportation, and other survival resources even as
they are cut off from family, friends, and other supports.”). Stark’s field-creating study focuses
on male-on-female abuse, and this Article will sometimes refer to abusers and the abused in those
gendered terms because of the available underlying sociological literature and the fact that
available evidence suggests women are more likely than men to be victims of domestic abuse. See
JENNIFER L. TRUMAN & RACHEL E. MORGAN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., NONFATAL DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE, 2003–2012, at 1 (2014), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ndv0312.pdf [https://
perma.cc/P2DV-3XTC] (suggesting that 76 percent of domestic violence is committed against
women). However, it is important to remember that not only does female-on-male domestic
violence occur, it may in fact be underreported. Rob Whitley, Domestic Violence Against Men:
No Laughing Matter, PSYCH. TODAY (Nov. 19, 2019), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/
talking-about-men/201911/domestic-violence-against-men-no-laughing-matter [https://perma.cc/
58NS-5NAM] (collecting international data suggesting that domestic violence against men is far
more widespread than the reported cases suggest). Furthermore, evidence suggests that LGBTQidentifying people are even more likely to be the victims of domestic violence than straightidentifying people: the American Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has found that
from a sample of 16,000 U.S. adults, 26 percent of homosexual men, 37.3 percent of bisexual men,
and 29 percent of heterosexual men had been a victim of interpersonal violence, compared to 43.8
percent of lesbian women, 61.1 percent of bisexual women and 35 percent of heterosexual
women. MIKEL L. WALTERS, JIERU CHEN & MATTHEW J. BREIDING, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION, THE NATIONAL INTIMATE PARTNER AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE
SURVEY 1–2 (2013), https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/nisvs_sofindings.pdf [https://
perma.cc/RPC4-66BF]. Finally, 54 percent of trans-identifying people report experiencing
intimate partner abuse, including physical harm and coercive control. NAT’L CTR. FOR
TRANSGENDER EQUAL., THE REPORT OF THE 2015 U.S. TRANSGENDER SURVEY: EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY 13 (2017), https://www.transequality.org/sites/default/files/docs/usts/Executive%
20Summary%20-%20FINAL%201.6.17.pdf [https://perma.cc/9YDV-AML8]. Thus, the ideas
developed in this Article are intended to apply to all abusive relationships between intimate
partners, regardless of the genders and sexualities of the parties involved.
9. See Nugent, supra note 1.
10. Id.
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servitude than assault.11 As criminal behavioralist Laura Richards puts
it, “Abuse is a pattern, a war of attrition that wears a person down.”12
Due in large part to the activism of researchers such as Stark and
Richards, the Parliament of the United Kingdom has recently passed
legislation that affirmatively criminalizes coercive control in England
and Wales.13 The new statute aims to capture the broad patterns of
subjugating interpersonal behavior that do not fall into the categories
of any existing crimes of physical violence. Section 76 of the United
Kingdom’s Serious Crime Act 2015 criminalizes causing someone to
fear that violence will be used against them on at least two occasions
or generating “serious alarm or distress” that has a “substantial adverse
effect” on their “usual day-to-day activities.”14 As the director of public
prosecutions put it at the time, coercive control
can limit victims’ basic human rights, such as their freedom of
movement and their independence . . . . Being subjected to repeated
humiliation, intimidation or subordination can be as harmful as
physical abuse, with many victims stating that trauma from
psychological abuse had a more lasting impact than physical abuse.15

In one of the earliest convictions under this law, Essex woman
Natalie Curtis’s husband received two years in prison for a pattern of
conduct that included calling her thirty to forty times a day, throwing
her belongings into her neighbor’s yard, breaking into irrational,
unpredictable rages, banging things on surfaces, and smashing up the
kitchen.16

11. See STARK, supra note 8, at 5–6, 11–12, 14–15.
12. Nugent, supra note 1.
13. See Sandra Walklate, The Sally Challen Case: Landmark Ruling or More of the Same?,
UNIV. LIVERPOOL NEWS (Mar. 5, 2019), https://news.liverpool.ac.uk/2019/03/05/the-sallychallen-case-landmark-ruling-or-more-of-the-same [https://perma.cc/462W-P8ZR] (“Sally
Challen’s defence team, and much of the press coverage . . . have made significant play of the
presence of this offence and its utility in cases . . . where there is evidence . . . that the defendant
was living in a coercive and controlling relationship as mitigation for their acts of violence in
response.”).
14. Serious Crime Act 2015, c. 9, § 76 (UK).
15. Owen Bowcott, Controlling or Coercive Domestic Abuse To Risk Five-Year Prison Term,
GUARDIAN (Dec. 28, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/society/2015/dec/29/domestic-abuselaw-controlling-coercive-behaviour [https://perma.cc/XFZ7-DU6Q].
16. See Jamie Grierson, ‘This Is Not Love’: Victim of Coercive Control Says She Saw Red
Flags from the Start, GUARDIAN (Jan. 20, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/society/2019/jan/
21/this-is-not-love-victim-of-coercive-control-says-she-saw-red-flags-from-start [https://perma.cc/
PGQ5-BYA4].
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Due to research showing that coercive control both imposes
devastating harm on victims17 and predicts future physical violence, it
is not surprising that some scholars of domestic abuse have called for
American jurisdictions to address it—with a few states taking up the
call.18 Indeed, Scotland, Ireland, and France have all adopted
legislation similar to the U.K. statute.19 Furthermore, emerging
evidence suggests the global COVID-19 lockdown, which has trapped
domestic partners in their homes together for an extended part of the
day, has led to an increase in the incidence and severity of domestic
violence, creating an even more urgent and pressing need to address
these escalating trends of abuse.20 Although excessive state
interference into intimate relations carries enormous risks to liberty
and privacy, those cannot be the sole considerations. The law’s
longstanding emphasis on privacy allowed even physically violent
abusers to escape prosecution until relatively recently.21 That said, any

17. This Article intentionally uses the term “victim” instead of “survivor” to describe those
affected by coercive control because it implicates both survivors and victims who eventually die
as a result of the abuse they experience. Indeed, the predictive nature of coercive control with
respect to murder is one of the primary arguments for legal intervention.
18. Hawaii has a coercive control offense and California a statute that allows evidence of
coercive control to be used as evidence of domestic violence in family court. See Melena Ryzik &
Katie Benner, What Defines Domestic Abuse? Survivors Say It’s More than Assault, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 26, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/22/us/cori-bush-fka-twigs-coercive-control.
html [https://perma.cc/ZFU3-H82K]. New York and Connecticut have also introduced coercive
control offenses. Id.; see also Kristy Candela, Protecting the Invisible Victim: Incorporating
Coercive Control in Domestic Violence Statutes, 54 FAM. CT. REV. 112, 112–14 (2016); Claire
Wright, Torture at Home: Borrowing from the Torture Convention To Define Domestic Violence,
24 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 457, 461 (2013) (making the related, though narrower, argument that
states should adopt a definition of “domestic violence” in child custody cases that includes mental
harm); Alexandra Michelle Ortiz, Note, Invisible Bars: Adapting the Crime of False Imprisonment
To Better Address Coercive Control and Domestic Violence in Tennessee, 71 VAND. L. REV. 681,
703 (2018) (proposing the crime of false imprisonment be expanded to include situations of
coercive control).
19. Domestic Violence Act 2018 (Act No. 6 2018) (Ir.); Domestic Abuse (Scotland) Act 2018
(ASP 5); Psychological Violence a Criminal Offence in France, BBC NEWS (June 30, 2010), https://
www.bbc.com/news/10459906 [https://perma.cc/U799-GJKM] (defining psychological violence as
“repeated acts which could be constituted by words or other machinations, to degrade one’s
quality of life and cause a change to one’s mental or physical state”).
20. See, e.g., Babina Gosangi, Hyesun Park, Richard Thomas, Rahul Gujrathi, Camden P.
Bay, Ali S. Raja, Steven E. Seltzer, Marta Chadwick Balcom, Meghan L. McDonald, Dennis P.
Orgill, Mitchel B. Harris, Giles W. Boland, Kathryn Rexrode & Bharti Khurana, Exacerbation of
Physical Intimate Partner Violence During COVID-19 Lockdown, RADIOLOGY 1, 4–7 (Aug. 13,
2020), https://pubs.rsna.org/doi/pdf/10.1148/radiol.2020202866 [https://perma.cc/8ZU7-8NLD].
21. See, e.g., D. KELLY WEISBERG & SUSAN FRELICH APPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAW
332 (6th ed. 2020).
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attempt to use the criminal law to address domestic abuse—like any
application of the criminal law—also creates the risk of racially
asymmetric enforcement, overincarceration, and disproportionate
impact on communities of color.22 Criminalizing coercive control would
therefore require, as a precondition, a substantially reformed
enforcement and sentencing environment.
Beyond the problems with enforcement, there are also numerous
constitutional and legal problems attendant to criminally punishing
someone for creating “serious alarm or distress” that has a “substantial
effect”23 on the victim. As Professor Jonathan Turley notes, the
ambiguity of the U.K. statutory terms “allows for a disturbing level of
discretion of prosecutors in picking marriages and relationships
deemed coercive” and, in cases where the victim is not physically
prevented from leaving, “the question is how to criminalize conduct
that can be highly subjective or interpretive.”24 Existing American
vagueness, overbreadth, and First Amendment jurisprudence would
seem to make this sort of effort unconstitutional. Administrability
concerns would seem to make it, at least, unadvisable.
This Article makes the first attempt to harmonize the goals
motivating § 76 of the United Kingdom’s Serious Crime Act 2015 with
principles of American criminal constitutional law. The purpose here
is not to advocate directly for immediate legislation. To avoid doing
more harm than good, legislation would have to accompany reforms to
the current law enforcement response to physical domestic violence,
which some domestic violence experts criticize as being culture-blind
and ineffective.25 The extensive research on policing and restorative
justice necessary to propose such a mechanism is beyond the scope of
this Article. It does, however, make the argument that a state
legislature could, consistent with well-established principles of criminal
law, draft an offense that punishes the nonviolent coercive control of
an intimate partner without resorting to the open-ended, potentially

22. See, e.g., Aya Gruber, The Feminist War on Crime, 92 IOWA L. REV. 741, 805–07 (2007).
23. Serious Crime Act 2015, c. 9, § 76 (UK).
24. Jonathan Turley, English Law Allows for Five Years in Prison for Spouses Who
Engage in “Coercive and Controlling Behavior,” JONATHAN T URLEY (Dec. 29, 2015), https://
jonathanturley.org/2015/12/29/english-law-allows-for-five-years-in-prison-for-spouses-whoengage-in-coercive-and-controlling-behavior [https://perma.cc/7VY7-ZVED].
25. See, e.g., Robert L. Hampton, Jaslean J. LaTaillade, Alicia Dacey & J.R. Marghi,
Evaluating Domestic Violence Interventions for Black Women, 16 J. AGGRESSION
MALTREATMENT & TRAUMA 330, 330–33 (2008).
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unconstitutional language adopted by the United Kingdom. As well,
this Article makes the broader claim that borrowing from other areas
of criminal law will produce a more robust and innovative solution than
the more compartmentalized approach often taken by reformers such
as those in the United Kingdom.
As I have noted elsewhere, courts and scholars have largely
developed the jurisprudential framework for corporate and
commercial criminal law separately from the law governing bodily
crimes, particularly gendered crimes such as sexual offenses.26 Here, I
argue that a state legislature could integrate the due process limits to
traditionally enterprise-related offenses, such as fraud and conspiracy,
with the goals of domestic abuse prevention to create a new offense
based upon the fraud-like nature of coercively controlling behavior.
Like criminal conspiracy, coercive control seeks to transform
individually legal—and even constitutionally protected—thoughts and
words into crimes based on sociological evidence that the context in
which they arise is uniquely dangerous. Like criminal fraud, coercive
control requires legislatures and courts to decide where, across the
spectrum of an individual’s potentially immoral behavior toward
another party, such behavior should become criminal. In fraud, that
line has to do with specific intent to use deceit to deprive the victim of
something of value. That the U.K. statute fails to draw an analogous
line is its major, though not only, failing.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I gathers the sociological
and criminological data on coercive control to demonstrate the legally
cognizable harms it causes and then summarizes the United Kingdom’s
legislative solution. Part II lays out the constitutional, evidentiary, and
policy problems with the United Kingdom’s coercive control law. Part
III argues that we can find solutions to these problems in the
jurisprudence of other substantive offenses that are based on
inherently criminal speech and communicative conduct. It argues that
a well-drafted coercive control offense should consider the
constitutional problems and existing case law of child and elder abuse,
stalking, false imprisonment, blackmail, conspiracy, and fraud. Part IV
integrates these solutions into a model coercive control statute. It
argues, perhaps counterintuitively, that the most useful criminal-law
framework for thinking about coercive control is that of common law

26. See e.g., Erin L. Sheley, Tort Answers to the Problem of Corporate Criminal Mens Rea,
97 N.C. L. REV. 773, 802–09 (2019) (arguing that existing principles of corporate criminal liability
logically allow for prosecution of corporations for sexual assault under certain circumstances).
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fraud, and that an equivalent to the scienter requirement of fraud can
and should apply to coercive control. Finally, it notes the remaining
policy questions a legislature should grapple with before criminalizing
coercive control. The Article concludes by arguing that it is risky for
legislatures to create a sui generis legal remedy for harmful “gendered”
conduct like coercive control, as opposed to harmonizing a new offense
with other, well-established crimes.
I. COERCIVE CONTROL AND THE HARMS IT CAUSES
Like the Sally Challen case did in the United Kingdom, the
popular Dirty John podcast (and subsequent television adaptation on
the Bravo network) introduced American audiences to the horrors of
unchecked coercive control. In Dirty John, Los Angeles Times reporter
Christopher Goffard tells the true story of John Meehan, a charming
con man who uses tactics of gaslighting, isolation, and manipulation to
slowly gain financial and physical control over his girlfriend Debra
Newell—a situation that becomes violent when Debra finally leaves
him and Meehan attempts to murder her daughter.27 Though these
stories surely resonate emotionally, the underlying psychological
dynamic of coercive control is complex and not necessarily intuitive to
a general public. This Part will provide a more precise definition of the
social problem being addressed by recognizing coercive control as a
crime and a summary of the new British legal framework designed to
confront it.
A. Definitions of Coercive Control
Anti–domestic violence advocates have long recognized the
relationship between physical violence and the background conditions
of psychological control that give rise to it. For example, the National
Domestic Violence Hotline defines domestic violence as “a pattern of
behaviors used by one partner to maintain power and control over
another partner in an intimate relationship.”28 This definition explicitly

27. See Haylee Barber, ‘Coercive Control’ Potential Factor in ‘Dirty John’ Case of
Psychological Abuse, NBC NEWS (Jan. 12, 2018, 6:39 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/dateline/
coercive-control-potential-factor-dirty-john-case-psychological-abuse-n837361 [https://perma.cc/
8FHS-K2PQ]; Christopher Goffard, Dirty John, Part One: The Real Thing, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 1,
2017), https://www.latimes.com/projects/la-me-dirty-john [https://perma.cc/J3KN-LDYE].
28. Understand Relationship Abuse, NAT’L DOMESTIC VIOLENCE HOTLINE (May 14, 2017),
https://www.thehotline.org/is-this-abuse/abuse-defined [https://perma.cc/KUV4-Z88J].
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lacks reference to a component of physical contact, focusing instead on
the abuser’s intent: maintaining power over another party. Stark, the
sociologist who popularized the concept of coercive control to capture
the systematic nature of domestic abuse, states that “the main means
used to establish control is the microregulation of everyday behaviors
associated with stereotypic female roles, such as how women dress,
cook, clean, socialize, care for their children, or perform sexually.”29
From this definition, one can see that a pattern of coercive control may
arise from myriad routine interactions, each of which on its own may
seem like run-of-the-mill nagging within a romantic relationship.
British legal scholar Vanessa Bettinson, a longtime advocate of
the new offense, summarizes the key aspects of coercive control as
“reflecting extreme examples of accepted male behaviours such as the
control of financial resources; the use of credible threats which may or
may not involve threats of physical violence; a victim feeling in need of
the dominator; damaged psychological well-being of the victim and a
high risk of suicide.”30 The complex dynamic of coercive control
contributes both to the harms it causes and the difficulty of capturing
it using the traditional tools of the criminal law.31
B. Identifying the Harms of Coercive Control
A core function of criminal law is to redress harm.32 Retributivists
urge that those who inflict harm on society should be punished to a
degree morally commensurate with that harm.33 Expressivists caution
that, should the justice system fail to punish harm, it risks sending a
message to victims and offenders that we, as a society, morally tolerate
those harms.34 Utilitarians care less about abstract morality and more

29. STARK, supra note 8, at 5.
30. Vanessa Bettinson, Aligning Partial Defences to Murder with the Offence of Coercive or
Controlling Behaviour, 83 J. CRIM. L. 71, 74 (2019).
31. As discussed in supra note 8, while the sociological literature on coercive control has, up
to this point, focused heavily on male-on-female abuse, the data on domestic violence generally
shows that abusive relationships arise between partners of all genders and sexualities.
32. See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2–3 (describing “public wrongs”
as “breach[es] and violation[s] of public rights and duties, which affect the whole community,
considered as a community” and stating that they “are distinguished by the harsher appellation
of crimes and misdemesnors [sic]”).
33. See, e.g., Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, 52 MONIST 475, 479 (1968).
34. See, e.g., JOEL FEINBERG, The Expressive Function of Punishment, in DOING &
DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY 95, 98–100 (1970); Jean Hampton, An
Expressive Theory of Retribution, in RETRIBUTIVISM AND ITS CRITICS 1, 19–21 (Wesley Cragg
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about deterring future harms, therefore arguing that the law should
only punish to the degree necessary to achieve optimal deterrence.35
Regardless of the theory of punishment one adopts, however, it is clear
that the legislature must identify the kind and severity of harm caused
by a behavior before it justifiably criminalizes it.
The question presented in the case of coercive control is, then,
what harms result from coercive behavior, short of physical violence
that is already criminal, between intimate parties? For most of history,
the law deemed even physical violence between domestic partners to
be a private matter, not harmful enough to warrant the attention of
criminal law.36 By publicly articulating the harms of domestic violence,
reformers in the 1970s and 1980s largely succeeded in prompting
courts, prosecutors, and legislators to recognize it as the criminal
battery it is.37 Many psychologists, sociologists, criminologists, and
anti–domestic violence advocates make similar arguments today about
the harms of coercive control. These harms fall into two general
categories: intrinsic harms and predicted harms.
1. Intrinsic Harms. Physical domestic violence imposes many
physical and psychological costs on its victims beyond the immediate
wounds themselves: The U.S. Department of Justice’s (“DOJ”)
National Institute of Justice reports that up to 88 percent of battered
women in shelters suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder
(“PTSD”).38 “[A]s many as 72 percent of abuse victims experience
depression . . . and 75 percent experience severe anxiety.”39 And studies
show that purely psychological violence is just as detrimental to a
victim’s mental health as its physical counterpart.40 A long period of

ed., 1992); JEFFRIE MURPHY, Forgiveness and Resentment, in FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 14, 25
(1988).
35. See, e.g., JEREMY BENTHAM, THE RATIONALE OF PUNISHMENT 19–22, 27–31 (London,
Robert Heward 1830); HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 36, 39–
41 (1968).
36. See, e.g., WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra note 21, at 332.
37. Cf. id. at 332–33.
38. ANDREW R. KLEIN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., NAT’L INST. OF JUST., PRACTICAL
IMPLICATIONS OF CURRENT DOMESTIC VIOLENCE RESEARCH: FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT,
PROSECUTORS AND JUDGES 30 (2009), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/225722.pdf [https://
perma.cc/48QP-3QQ4].
39. Id. (citation omitted).
40. See Maria A. Pico-Alfonso, M. Isabel Garcia-Linares, Nuria Celda-Navarro, Concepción
Blasco-Ros, Enrique Echeburúa & Manuela Martinez, The Impact of Physical, Psychological, and
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coercive control creates “psychological trauma, making victims
vulnerable as the trauma overrides the ability to control their lives and
experience feelings of helplessness and terror.”41 Furthermore,
research links both physical and psychological domestic violence to a
range of physical harms to the victim, including disability preventing
work, arthritis, chronic pain, migraine and other frequent headaches,
stammering, sexually transmitted infections,, chronic pelvic pain,
stomach ulcers, spastic colon, frequent indigestion, diarrhea,
constipation, and suicide.42
Beyond the empirically measurable medical impacts, a victim of
nonviolent coercive control suffers another sort of harm in common
with the victim of physical violence: a loss of autonomy.43 Stark defines
coercive control as conduct intended to undermine another person’s
autonomy, freedom, and integrity.44 Scholars of coercive control often
refer to it, for that reason, as a “liberty crime.”45 As Professors Vanessa
Bettinson and Charlotte Bishop put it, arguing for what would become
§ 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015, “Whereas many criminal offences
protect individuals against ‘the reduction of options’, domestic abuse
involves not only the options of the victim being reduced, but also the
options that remain being subject to unwarranted and arbitrary control
by another person.”46 Many scholars agree that nonviolent coercive

Sexual Intimate Male Partner Violence on Women’s Mental Health: Depressive Symptoms,
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, State Anxiety, and Suicide, 15 J. WOMEN’S HEALTH 599, 609 (2006).
41. Bettinson, supra note 30, at 73.
42. Ann L. Coker, Paige H. Smith, Lesa Bethea, Melissa R. King & Robert E. McKeown,
Physical Health Consequences of Physical and Psychological Intimate Partner Violence, 9
ARCHIVES FAM. MED. 451, 455–56 (2000) (“We found that psychological violence was associated
with many of the same health outcomes as was physical IPV.”). Victims of coercive control are
also at a greater risk of suicide. See RUTH AITKEN & VANESSA E. MUNRO, DOMESTIC ABUSE
AND SUICIDE 11 (2018), http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/103609/1/WRAP-Domestic-abuse-andsuicide-Munro-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/U8SW-S8RA].
43. See, e.g., Cheryl Hanna, The Paradox of Progress: Translating Evan Stark’s Coercive
Control into Legal Doctrine for Abused Women, 15 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1458, 1459–61
(2009).
44. See STARK, supra note 8, at 15.
45. See id. at 380–82; Emma Williamson, Living in the World of the Domestic Violence
Perpetrator: Negotiating the Unreality of Coercive Control, 16 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1412,
1414 (2010); see also JUDITH LEWIS HERMAN, TRAUMA AND RECOVERY: THE AFTERMATH OF
VIOLENCE—FROM DOMESTIC ABUSE TO POLITICAL TERROR 74–75 (1992) (characterizing
domestic violence as a relationship based in coercive control and explaining that this type of
relationship imposes “domestic captivity” on women).
46. Vanessa Bettinson & Charlotte Bishop, Is the Creation of a Discrete Offence of Coercive
Control Necessary To Combat Domestic Violence?, 66 N. IR. LEGAL Q. 179, 183 (2015).
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control, alone or in concert with physical domestic violence, imposes a
set of harms unique in their temporal duration and comprehensive
scope—the purpose of coercive control is for an abuser indefinitely to
dictate all aspects of a victim’s life.47 The case studies with which this
Article opened all demonstrate the complexity and duration of the
harms suffered by victims of coercive control. As Professor Deborah
Tuerkheimer puts it, the “transactional model” of crime—in which the
system treats a single action such as a battery as a cognizable offense—
misses the reality of domestic abuse as “an ongoing pattern of conduct
occurring within a relationship characterized by power and control.”48
2. Predicted Harms. In addition to harming a victim directly
through coercive control itself, an individual who engages in it is more
likely to become physically violent in the future.49 A DOJ National
Institute of Justice study found that intimate partners who exercised
control over their partners’ daily activities were more than five times
more likely to kill them.50 When compared with “situational” intimate
partner violence, violence arising in coercively controlling
47. See Mary Ann Dutton & Lisa A. Goodman, Coercion in Intimate Partner Violence:
Toward a New Conceptualization, 52 SEX ROLES 743, 746–48 (2005); Donald G. Dutton & Susan
Painter, Emotional Attachments in Abusive Relationships: A Test of Traumatic Bonding Theory,
8 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 105, 107 (1993); Tamara L. Kuennen, Analyzing the Impact of Coercion
on Domestic Violence Victims, 22 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 2, 2–3 (2007); Victor Tadros,
The Distinctiveness of Domestic Abuse: A Freedom Based Account, 65 LA. L. REV. 989, 989–94
(2005).
48. Deborah Tuerkheimer, Recognizing and Remedying the Harm of Battery: A Call To
Criminalize Domestic Violence, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 959, 960–61 (2004); see also
Margaret E. Johnson, Redefining Harm, Re-Imagining Remedies, and Reclaiming Domestic
Violence Law, 42 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 1107, 1112 (2009) (noting the law’s inability to address
harms of women who are not subjected to distinguishable acts of violence).
49. See, e.g., STARK, supra note 8, at 276 (concluding that coercive control is “the most
dangerous” context in which women are abused); Pico-Alfonso et al., supra note 40, at 602. See
generally Christopher M. Murphy & K. Daniel O’Leary, Psychological Aggression Predicts
Physical Aggression in Early Marriage, 57 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCH. 579 (1989)
(demonstrating that psychological aggression predicts physical aggression).
50. Jacquelyn C. Campbell, Daniel Webster, Jane Koziol-McLain, Carolyn Rebecca Block,
Doris Campbell, Mary Ann Curry, Faye Gary, Judith McFarlane, Carolyn Sachs, Phyllis Sharps,
Yvonne Ulrich & Susan A. Wilt, Assessing Risk Factors for Intimate Partner Homicide, 250 NAT’L
INST. JUST. J. 14, 17 (2003), https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/jr000250e.pdf [https://perma.cc/4KQ5LEXL]; see also Neil Websdale, Assessing Risk in Domestic Violence Cases, in ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 38, 40 (Nicky Ali Jackson ed., 2007) (citing “obsessive possessiveness
or morbid jealousy” as a factor “[t]he research literature consistently identifies . . . as central to
intimate partner homicides”); Signs of an Abusive Partner, NAT’L COAL. AGAINST DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE, https://ncadv.org/signs-of-abuse [https://perma.cc/S4T2-7PH5] (identifying numerous
nonviolent controlling behaviors as “warning signs” of violence).

SHELEY IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1334

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

2/23/2021 9:06 PM

[Vol. 70:1321

relationships tends to be more frequent and more severe.51 In
coercively controlling relationships, acts of severe physical, sexual, and
emotional abuse, harassment, coercion, and control are more likely to
continue and even escalate after partners separate because abusers
subjectively experience separation as a loss of control.52 Furthermore,
coercive controllers pose risks not only to their partners but to their
children, particularly in cases of divorce. The Department of Justice of
Canada warns that “the risk of lethal violence is particularly high
following parental separation” and lists as a risk factor for such
violence “[u]sing the child as a weapon . . . to continue to intimidate,
harass, or exert control over their ex-spouse.”53
51. Nicola Graham-Kevan & John Archer, Intimate Terrorism and Common Couple
Violence. A Test of Johnson’s Predictions in Four British Samples, 18 J. INTERPERSONAL
VIOLENCE 1247, 1265 (2003) (“[C]ontrolling behaviors are a risk marker for high frequency,
injurious, escalating physical aggression.”); Jennifer L. Hardesty, Kimberly A. Crossman, Megan
L. Haselschwerdt, Marcela Raffaelli, Brian G. Ogolsky & Michael P. Johnson, Toward a Standard
Approach to Operationalizing Coercive Control and Classifying Violence Types, 77 J. MARRIAGE
FAM. 833, 839 (2015) (finding that the frequency and severity of violent acts were greater for
mothers who experienced controlling behaviors); Michael P. Johnson & Janel M. Leone, The
Differential Effects of Intimate Terrorism and Situational Couple Violence: Findings from the
National Violence Against Women Survey, 26 J. FAM. ISSUES 322, 335 (2005) (finding that women
subjected to nonviolent controlling behaviors experienced more frequent violence); Andy Myhill,
Measuring Coercive Control: What Can We Learn from National Population Surveys?, 21
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 355, 366 (2015) (“[R]elationships with coercive control are
characterized by more frequent and severe violence . . . .”); Samantha K. Nielsen, Jennifer L.
Hardesty & Marcela Raffaelli, Exploring Variations Within Situational Couple Violence and
Comparisons With Coercive Controlling Violence and No Violence/No Control, 22 VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN 206, 215 (2016) (explaining that mothers who are not subjected to control
tactics in addition to violence experienced less severe violence than mothers subjected to control
tactics); Paige Hall Smith, Gloria E. Thornton, Robert DeVellis, Joanne Earp & Ann L. Coker,
A Population-Based Study of the Prevalence and Distinctiveness of Battering, Physical Assault,
and Sexual Assault in Intimate Relationships, 8 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1208, 1216–17 (2002)
(finding correlations among different types of violence).
52. See Myhill, supra note 51, at 368 (identifying separation as a risk factor for intimate
partner violence); Petra Ornstein & Johanna Rickne, When Does Intimate Partner Violence
Continue After Separation?, 19 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 617, 619–21 (2013).
53. PETER JAFFE, KATREENA SCOTT, ANGELIQUE JENNEY, MYRNA DAWSON, ANNA-LEE
STRAATMAN & MARCIE CAMPBELL, DEP’T OF JUST. OF CAN., RISK FACTORS FOR CHILDREN IN
SITUATIONS OF FAMILY VIOLENCE IN THE CONTEXT OF SEPARATION AND DIVORCE 19 (2014),
https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/cj-jp/fv-vf/rfcsfv-freevf/rfcsfv-freevf.pdf [https://perma.cc/9KR7N3LJ]. Abusive partners also frequently use the divorce court system as a means of coercively
controlling their partners once they no longer have physical access to them after a separation. See,
e.g., Heather Douglas, Legal Systems Abuse and Coercive Control, 18 CRIM. & CRIM. JUST. 84, 85–
86 (2018); Susan L. Miller & Nicole L. Smolter, ‘Paper Abuse’: When All Else Fails, Batterers Use
Procedural Stalking, 17 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 637, 637–38 (2011); Brittany E. Hayes,
Abusive Men’s Indirect Control of their Partner During the Process of Separation, 27 J. FAM.
VIOLENCE 333, 334 (2012).
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This particular risk of coercive control came to national attention
in Canada after forty-one-year-old father Andrew Berry stabbed his
four- and six-year-old little girls to death on Christmas Day 2017.54
Berry had partial custody after a court had determined—consistent
with the background presumptions of the governing law—that a
husband’s controlling behavior against his wife should not affect a
custody determination so long as he has never been violent toward the
children themselves, because contact with a father is presumptively
considered to be in the best interest of a child.55 Due in large part to
the complex relationship between coercive control and physical
violence, one can set aside the direct psychological harms caused by
the controlling behavior and nonetheless identify the future physical
harm to victims and their children posed by such behavior. It should
also be noted that—as in the case of Sally Challen—coercive control
predicts violent behavior by the abused party as well as the abuser.56 In
her qualitative study of the transcripts of trials of women who had
killed their batterers, Professor Elizabeth Sheehy found that coercive
control factors are “more predictive of intimate homicide than the
severity or frequency of . . . physical violence.”57
C. The U.K. Legislative Response
In the face of a growing understanding of the harms of coercive
control, § 76 of the United Kingdom’s Serious Crime Act 2015 now
criminalizes coercive or controlling behavior in an intimate or family
relationship. Public support for the bill derived in part from a report
released by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (“HMIC”),
which highlighted the inadequacies of police response to domestic
violence.58 The report found that, despite improvements in
54. Louise Dickson, Trial of Oak Bay Man Accused of Killing His Two Daughters Begins
in Vancouver, TIMES-COLONIST (Apr. 16, 2019), https://www.timescolonist.com/news/local/
trial-of-oak-bay-man-accused-of-killing-his-two-daughters-begins-in-vancouver-1.23793283
[https://perma.cc/QH5E-PWLW].
55. Lori Chambers, Deb Zweep & Nadia Verrelli, Paternal Filicide and Coercive Control:
Reviewing the Evidence in Cotton v. Berry, 51 UBC L. REV. 671, 674 (2018).
56. See supra notes 1–7.
57. ELIZABETH A. SHEEHY, DEFENDING BATTERED WOMEN ON TRIAL: LESSONS FROM
THE TRANSCRIPTS 235 (2014).
58. HER MAJESTY’S INSPECTORATE OF CONSTABULARY, EVERYONE’S BUSINESS:
IMPROVING THE POLICE RESPONSE TO DOMESTIC ABUSE 50 (2014), https://www.
justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/improving-the-police-responseto-domestic-abuse.pdf [https://perma.cc/L4QT-MBZG].
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prosecutorial practices surrounding domestic violence itself, police
struggled to understand the nature of coercive control, which is a
defining feature of many domestic violence cases.59 Eventually, the
Home Office concluded there was a gap in the existing substantive
legal framework’s focus on isolated incidents of physical violence,
which failed to capture the ongoing nature of domestic abuse.60
The new § 76 states:
(1) A person (A) commits an offence if—
a.

A repeatedly or continuously engages in behaviour
towards another person (B) that is controlling or coercive,

b. at the time of the behaviour, A and B are personally
connected,
c.

the behaviour has a serious effect on B, and

d. A knows or ought to know that the behaviour will have a
serious effect on B.61

Commentators observe that the requirement that the behavior be
“repeated” or “continuous” avoids criminalizing the benign everyday
power struggles in intimate relationships.62 However, the statute
provides no definition of what “controlling or coercive” means under
subsection (1)a. Bettinson suggests that courts look to the Home
Office’s definitions in its guidance manual on domestic violence and
abuse, which describes “controlling” behavior as: “a range of acts
designed to make a person subordinate and/or dependent by isolating
them from sources of support, exploiting their resources and capacities
for personal gain, depriving them of the means needed for
independence, resistance and escape and regulating their everyday
behaviour.”63 The manual defines “coercive” behavior as “an act or
pattern of acts of assault, threats, humiliation and intimidation or other
abuse that is used to harm, punish, or frighten their victim.”64

59. Id. at 30.
60. Bettinson & Bishop, supra note 46, at 185.
61. Serious Crime Act 2015, c. 9, § 76 (UK).
62. Bettinson & Bishop, supra note 46, at 191.
63. Id. at 180 (citing HOME OFF., GUIDANCE: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND ABUSE (2013)
[hereinafter HOME OFF. GUIDANCE]).
64. Id. (citing HOME OFF. GUIDANCE, supra note 63).
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Though other statutory terms are more precise, some raise
additional interpretive problems. The statute elsewhere specifies that
“personally connected” means that A and B have an “intimate” or
“family relationship.”65 The requisite “serious effect on B” occurs
when either “it causes B to fear, on at least two occasions, that violence
will be used against B” or “it causes B serious alarm or distress which
has a substantial adverse effect on B’s usual day-to-day activities.”66
Commentators note that the text of the statute does not make it clear
whether a subjective or objective standard should be applied to the
question of whether B experiences fear or alarm—in other words,
whether the jury would need to find that such alarm was reasonable or
merely honestly felt.67 Finally, the objective mens rea standard requires
only that the defendant “knows or ought to know” that his conduct
would cause fear or alarm,68 which precludes the defense that he did
not intend to cause such fear. As commentators observed of the
harassment statutes on which the mens rea element of the coercive
control offense is based, “for the victim, the behaviour is ‘no less
harmful because it is unintentional.’”69
To date, U.K. enforcement of this offense has been spotty. By the
end of 2016, 155 people had been prosecuted under the statute, but
many of those cases involved coercive control in addition to some form
of physical violence.70 One example of a case of purely nonviolent
control was that of Bexhill man Paul Playle, who was convicted for
psychological tactics such as stalking his wife online by sending
messages to people from her online accounts, telling her that her prior
partner was responsible, and then comforting her in her distress.71 He
was sentenced to three years and six months in prison.72 Though the
U.K. experience with criminalizing coercive control remains, itself, a
work in progress, evaluating the offense as a hypothetical in the
American legal context poses even more challenges.

65. Serious Crime Act 2015, c. 9, § 76(2) (UK).
66. Id. § 76(4).
67. Bettinson & Bishop, supra note 46, at 194.
68. Serious Crime Act 2015, c. 9, § 76(1)(d), (5) (UK).
69. Bettinson & Bishop, supra note 46, at 195 (citing Emily Finch, The Perfect Stalking Law:
An Evaluation of the Efficacy of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, 2002 CRIM. L. REV.
704).
70. Bettinson, supra note 30, at 77–78.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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II. PROBLEMS WITH CRIMINALIZING COERCIVE CONTROL
This Part considers the problems the U.K. version of coercive
control would create under American criminal, constitutional, and
evidentiary laws, as well as the policy questions it would raise.
A. Substantive Problems
The most significant problem with a coercive control offense like
§ 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015 is that it probably violates the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Specifically,
it creates problems of vagueness and overbreadth and may
impermissibly criminalize thought.
1. Vagueness. A statute that “either forbids or requires the doing
of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning” violates the Due Process Clauses.73
Such a statute fails to put a person on sufficient notice of the content
of the criminal law for him to conform his behavior to it.74 It also
encourages arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement by the
government and constitutes an impermissible delegation of legislative
authority to law enforcement.75
Several well-known Supreme Court vagueness cases have
involved vagrancy statutes. In Kolender v. Lawson,76 the Court struck
down a California statute requiring persons loitering on the streets to
provide “credible and reliable” identification whenever requested by
the police.77 The statute was unconstitutionally vague because it failed
to define what “credible and reliable” identification meant.78 More
recently, in Chicago v. Morales,79 the Court invalidated a Chicago
ordinance intended to prevent “criminal street gang members” from
loitering in public places.”80 The ordinance defined “loiter” as “to
remain in any one place with no apparent purpose,”81 a definition that
73. Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
74. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572 (1974).
75. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983); see also Smith, 415 U.S. at 578 (criticizing
the unfettered latitude vague statutes give to law enforcement officials).
76. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983).
77. Id. at 353–54.
78. Id.
79. Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999).
80. Id. at 46–47.
81. Id. at 56.
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the Court deemed unconstitutionally vague.82 The Court found that
“the city cannot conceivably have meant to criminalize each instance a
citizen stands in public with a gang member,” and therefore “the
vagueness that dooms [the] ordinance is not the product of uncertainty
about the normal meaning of ‘loitering,’ but rather about what loitering
is covered by the ordinance and what is not.”83
The vagueness doctrine proved to be alive and well in a recent
high-profile case: the prosecution of Jeff Skilling, former CEO of the
Enron Corporation, for his role in his company’s famous accounting
fraud scandal in 2003.84 The U.S. government charged Skilling with
(among many other things) honest services fraud under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1346 for misrepresenting Enron’s financial health by concealing the
corporation’s losses in separate trusts off of Enron’s books. The
government asserted that he thereby defrauded shareholders by
profiting from their losses when he earned enormous, undeserved
executive bonuses tied to certain quarterly earnings-per-share
targets.85 Skilling’s vagueness challenge to his honest services fraud
conviction turned on what it means to defraud someone of “the
intangible right of honest services,” which the government urged the
Court to construe as including any instance of “undisclosed selfdealing.”86 Declining to read the offense this broadly, the Court noted
that the “core application” of honest services fraud historically had
consisted of cases involving specifically bribes and kickbacks.87 The
Court thus cited the need to avoid a potential vagueness problem in
holding that honest services fraud under § 1346 “does not encompass
conduct more wide ranging than the paradigmatic cases of bribes and
kickbacks” and “resist[ed] the Government’s less constrained
construction absent Congress’ clear instruction otherwise.”88
These cases suggest that a coercive control statute with language
like that adopted in the United Kingdom would likely fail to pass
constitutional muster on vagueness grounds.89 Most notably, the U.K.
statute’s failure to define what constitutes “controlling or coercive”
82. See id. at 60 (explaining that the ordinance’s failure to specify a standard of conduct
dooms it as unconstitutionally vague).
83. Id. at 57.
84. Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 369 (2010).
85. Id. at 367–69.
86. Id. at 409.
87. Id. at 410.
88. Id. at 411.
89. See Ortiz, supra note 18, at 698 (making note of this problem).
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conduct would require courts to make an arguably even more openended determination than previously invalidated statutory
determinations, such as the risk-of-injury determination required by
the invalidated clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act. Unlike the
U.K. statute, this clause at least required the government to show that
a crime had been committed at all before the court was forced to
evaluate the risk of injury such a crime would pose in the abstract. In
the same way that the Court concluded in Morales that the city of
Chicago could not have intended to criminalize every instance of a
person standing on a street in the company of a gang member, it would
seem unlikely that any legislature motivated to criminalize coercive
control would do so by criminalizing every single action toward an
intimate partner that could be considered “controlling.” A standard
dictionary definition of the verb “control” is “exercise restraining or
directing influence over.”90 In such a world, nagging one’s partner to
take out the garbage—clearly a form of directing influence!—could be
a criminal offense.
The element of the offense requiring that the coercive control has
a “serious effect” on the victim may also be unconstitutionally vague.
Parliament does provide more precise guidance on this prong, defining
“serious effect” as either causing the victim to fear physical violence on
at least two occasions or causing her91 “serious alarm or distress which
has a substantial adverse effect on [her] usual day-to-day activities.”92
The second category of “substantial adverse effect” would seem to
raise questions as to what conduct is actually prohibited: If a person is
in a bad mood throughout her work day due to a fight her husband
picked in the morning does that become criminal coercive control? As
with the loitering provision in Morales, it seems unlikely that any
legislature could intend every set of facts fitting that definition to
constitute a crime, which means that such language inherently
delegates the choice of enforcement to the government.

90. Control, M ERRIAM -WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/control
[https://perma.cc/U5N8-AHME].
91. Due to most of the available studies on coercive control focusing on male perpetrators
and female targets, this Article will sometimes use the female pronoun. As discussed in supra note
8, however, domestic abuse occurs between partners of all genders and the recommendations of
this Article are intended to apply gender neutrally.
92. Serious Crime Act 2015, c. 9, § 76 (UK).
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2. Overbreadth. A law is overbroad if it prohibits not only acts the
legislature may forbid, but also constitutionally protected conduct.93 It
is only overbroad if it “reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally
protected conduct.”94 This means that for a court to declare a law
unconstitutionally overbroad it must be so intrusive on a fundamental
right—either qualitatively, quantitatively, or both—that its negative
impact on free exercise outweighs the positive social benefits that flow
from its application to other, unprotected conduct.95 Courts will not
find a law to be void for overbreadth if there is a way to sever the
unconstitutional portion96 or construe it in such a way as to limit its
reach only to constitutionally permissible applications.97
Furthermore, unlike many other constitutional claims, a
defendant who wishes to mount an overbreadth challenge to a statute
need not demonstrate standing: a “person whose activity may be
constitutionally regulated nevertheless may argue that the statute
under which he is convicted or regulated is invalid on its face” if it
would be overbroad in some set of circumstances.98 (Courts will
generally decline to use the overbreadth doctrine to find laws facially
invalid if they can conclude that such laws are unconstitutional as
applied to the particular party.99) Historically, the Supreme Court has
applied the overbreadth doctrine primarily in the context of the First
Amendment right to freedom of speech and on several occasions
rejected such claims in other areas.100 Yet it remains unclear whether
the doctrine may in fact be cognizable in other constitutional
contexts.101 Professor John Decker points out, for example, that in
93. Schwartzmiller v. Gardner, 752 F.2d 1341, 1346 (9th Cir. 1984).
94. Vill. of Hoffman Ests. v. Flipside, Hoffman Ests., Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494 (1982).
95. John F. Decker, Overbreadth Outside the First Amendment, 34 N.M. L. REV. 53, 56 (2004)
(citing Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119 (2003)).
96. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 760 (1974).
97. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 118–22 (1990).
98. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 768 n.21 (1982) (emphasis added).
99. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 483 (2010) (Alito, J., dissenting).
100. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 268–69 n.18 (1984).
101. Compare Ferber, 495 U.S. at 768 (“The doctrine is predicated on the sensitive nature of
protected expression.”), with Decker, supra note 95, at 59 (holding a law outlawing all picketing
contrary to the First Amendment right of association (citing Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88,
97 (1940))), Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 293–95 (1951) (finding a municipal ordinance to
hold public worship meetings on the street without obtaining an advance permit facially invalid
in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments), Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296,
300–07 (1940) (ruling that a state statute that prohibits solicitation of money for religious,
charitable, or philanthropic causes unless the secretary of the Public Welfare Council approves
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right-to-privacy cases arising after Griswold v. Connecticut102 and Roe
v. Wade,103 the Supreme Court has entertained overbreadth claims
without rejecting them outright for not implicating the First
Amendment.104
In any case, it is clear that a statute criminalizing nonviolent
coercive control could create an overbreadth problem. Namely, much
of interpersonal controlling conduct defined by sociological
literature—for example, “regulating” a partner’s “everyday
behavior”—necessarily takes the form of speech. Analogous
challenges arose to the antistalking statutes, which most states adopted
in the 1990s in response to increased public awareness of the dangers
of stalking behavior, particularly in the domestic violence context.105
The content of antistalking offenses varies by state, but many have
basic elements in common.106 For example, California, the first state to
create such an offense, defines it as “willfully, maliciously, and
repeatedly” following or harassing another person and making a
“credible threat with the intent to place that person in reasonable fear
of his or her safety.”107
Forty-six state stalking statutes have withstood vagueness and
overbreadth challenges.108 However, in upholding these statutes courts
generally rely in part on their requirement that the prohibited
such cause and determines the cause or religion is a bona fide organization violates the First and
Fourteenth Amendment right to exercise religion), and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 53, 58–
60 (1967) (holding that a state statute that authorizes eavesdropping pursuant to a court order but
on less than probable cause for a two-month period, with no termination provision or after-thefact notice, is contrary to the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments).
102. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
103. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
104. Decker, supra note 95, at 90.
105. J. Alan Baty, Alabama’s Stalking Statutes: Coming Out of the Shadows, 48 ALA. L. REV.
229, 229–30 (1996).
106. As the American Law Reports explain:
Although antistalking statutes, in general terms, have some similarities,
considerable variation is to be found regarding: (a) what course of conduct suffices to
constitute stalking, assuming the presence of any requisite mental state and risked or
resulting consequences; (b) what varieties of fear suffice to establish the risked or
resulting consequences, including whether that fear must be established by a subjective
test, an objective test, or both; (c) what kind of mental state the stalker must have, and,
in particular, whether the mental state must exist only as to the underlying conduct or
instead or in addition as to the fear-producing consequences; and (d) what aggravating
circumstances suffice to make the crime of stalking a higher level offense.
6 George L. Blum, Validity of State Stalking Statutes, A.L.R. 7TH 491, 495–96 (2015).
107. CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (West 2020).
108. Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61, 93 n.237 (2009).
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harassing conduct include at least an implied threat of physical injury
or fear thereof on the part of the victim.109 It is well settled that the free
speech right does not prevent a state from criminalizing threats due to
the overriding interest in protecting its citizens “from the fear of
violence, from the disruption that fear engenders, and from the
possibility that the threatened violence will occur.”110 Thus, while
antistalking statutes are directed at a particular form of interpersonal
behavior—a pattern of unwanted conduct or pursuit—they are
nonetheless typically grounded in the existence of a physical threat or
fear thereof to pass First Amendment overbreadth scrutiny. This
Article will discuss the relevance of antistalking statutes to the coercive
control question in much greater detail in Part II.D. For now, it is
simply worth noting that the new U.K. law lacks a requirement of
threatened physical violence, as it defines “serious effects” on the
victim to include not only fear of violence but also mere “distress” that
has a “substantial effect” on day-to-day activities. The U.K. statute as
written would therefore raise significant overbreadth questions in the
United States.
3. Prohibition on “Thought Crimes.” The third substantive
objection to a coercive control offense also relates to the First
Amendment, but it is a bit more theoretical than doctrinal. Most First
Amendment scholars recognize an implicit right to “freedom of
thought,” which appears nowhere in the Constitution but is arguably
implied in the right to freedom of expression.111 Some scholars argue
that the First Amendment is intended to protect the self-realization of
the individual citizen, a theory which, if accepted, requires
“governmental respect for the sanctity of an individual’s thought

109. See, e.g., State v. Randall, 669 So. 2d 223, 226 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995); People v. Borrelli,
77 Cal. App. 4th 703, 713–14 (5th Dist. 2000); People v. Baer, 973 P.2d 1225, 1231–32 (Colo. 1999);
United States v. Smith, 685 A.2d 380, 388 (D.C. 1996); People v. Bailey, 167 Ill. 2d 210, 227 (1995);
Clements v. State, 19 S.W.3d 442, 451 (Tex. App. Houston 1st Dist. 2000). But see People v.
Relerford, 104 N.E.3d 341, 356 (Ill. 2017) (striking down as unconstitutionally overbroad the
subsection of the revised Illinois stalking statute that makes it criminal to negligently
“communicate[] to or about” a person, “where the speaker knows or should know the
communication would cause a reasonable person to suffer emotional distress”).
110. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992).
111. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Freedom of Thought as Freedom of Expression: Hate Crime
Sentencing Enhancement and First Amendment Theory, 11 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 29, 32 (1992)
(noting that freedom of expression presupposes freedom of thought).
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processes.”112 Others argue that the First Amendment speaks not of
individual development but to popular sovereignty and democratic
processes.113 But even under this model, “to be effective citizens in a
democratic society, individuals must be able to exercise free will—an
impossibility if governmental thought control is permitted.”114 For
example, critics of sentencing enhancements for “hate” crimes argue
that “[b]ecause such laws are adopted for the very purpose of
penalizing thought processes and political motivations found to be
offensive by those in power, they constitute classic abridgements of the
constitutionally protected freedom of thought.”115 Hate-crime
enhancements have passed constitutional scrutiny, but it is important
to note that they nonetheless require indisputably criminal acts as their
predicates.116
The potential First Amendment prohibition on punishing thought
tracks with the even older common law requirement that a crime
contain a voluntary act element.117 As Professor Michael Corrado
summarizes it:
No one should be punished except for something she does. She
shouldn’t be punished for what wasn’t done at all; she shouldn’t be
punished for what someone else does; she shouldn’t be punished for
being the sort of person she is . . . . Our conduct is what justifies
punishing us.118

The common law preference for action as the basis of criminal liability
explains why even attempt statutes punish only those attempters who
have taken a “substantial step” or “overt act” toward accomplishing
their criminal goals.119
Against this backdrop, the idea of a coercive control offense
premised on otherwise legal conduct raises some concerns. If a person
does things that are in and of themselves legal to do—such as
112. See, e.g., id.
113. See, e.g., ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 27 (1960) (“The principle of
the freedom of speech springs from the necessities of the program of self-government . . . . It is a
deduction from the basic American agreement that public issues shall be decided by universal
suffrage.”).
114. Redish, supra note 111, at 32.
115. Id. at 37.
116. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 490 (1993).
117. Michael Corrado, Is There an Act Requirement in the Criminal Law?, 142 U. PA. L. REV.
1529, 1529 (1994).
118. Id.
119. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-4-2 (2014); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.405 (2017).
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constantly complaining about or insulting his partner’s actions or
allocating financial resources (to the extent otherwise legal under the
property laws)—he might well qualify as coercively controlling under
the U.K. statute. Yet in such cases it appears to be the coercive
motivation (in addition to the emotional effects on the victim)—that
attracts the criminal sanction. By contrast, hate-crime enhancements
increase the punishment for already criminal conduct based on the
biased motivation of the defendant. If such enhancements have raised
colorable freedom-of-thought objections, a coercive control offense
would surely attract more forceful ones.
B. Evidentiary Problems
The U.K. experience has also generated some discussion about the
pragmatic evidentiary problems attendant to charging and convicting
someone of coercive control. In the first place, U.K. scholarship
suggests that law enforcement is not particularly good at identifying
what constitutes coercive control120 (though other research indicates
that they have gotten somewhat better at it with the increased attention
to the problem in public discourse121). This stands to reason: our
understanding of the harms of coercive control comes from complex,
controversial psychological and sociological research, not easily
digested by nonspecialists.
Furthermore, coercive control prosecutions are likely to be
hampered by a big problem common to sexual assault cases and
domestic violence cases more generally: victim credibility. The fact of
the matter is that traumatized victims simply don’t make very good
witnesses.122 Research indicates that during a traumatic incident the
brain switches off the parts of itself associated with self-awareness,123
resulting in a dissociation in which aspects of the experience—such as
120. See, e.g., Amanda L. Robinson, Gillian M. Pinchevsky & Jennifer Guthrie, Under the
Radar: Policing Non-Violent Domestic Abuse in the US and UK, 40 INT’L J. COMP. & APPLIED
CRIM. JUST. 195, 195 (2016) (finding that “the use of physical violence is at the forefront of many
officers’ expectations about domestic abuse, and that when physical violence is absent, the police
response is less proactive”).
121. See, e.g., id.
122. Charlotte Bishop & Vanessa Bettinson, Evidencing Domestic Violence, Including
Behaviour that Falls Under the New Offence of “Controlling or Coercive Behaviour,” 22 INT’L J.
EVID. & PROOF 3, 15 (2018) [hereinafter Bishop & Bettinson, Evidencing].
123. See generally PAUL FREWEN & RUTH LANIUS, HEALING THE TRAUMATIZED SELF:
CONSCIOUSNESS, NEUROSCIENCE AND TREATMENT (2015) (describing the brain processes
associated with trauma).
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consciousness, memory, emotions, bodily sensations, thoughts, and
sensory perceptions—split off, or dissociate, from one another.124 Once
these aspects of experience dissociate, the trauma victim is unlikely to
recall them as a cohesive memory.125 As the very essence of the
coercive control offense requires that the defendant’s behavior has had
a “serious effect” on the victim, it would seem almost to require that
the government prove trauma as an element of the offense. Yet if a
trauma victim cannot recall a cohesive account of her experience, her
testimony lacks the indicia of credibility adequate to prove anything
under traditional principles of evidence law.126 On the flip side, if we
take these testimonial limitations as evidence of trauma, how do we
distinguish a genuine account from one in which the lack of coherence
arises from lying? These questions are hardly unique to the offense of
coercive control, but they are particularly confounding in this context,
where there is less likely to be physical or other supporting evidence.
C. Policy Problems
Even if there were no blackletter legal barriers to criminalizing
coercive control, there are a number of very good reasons why we
might hesitate to do so. The policy debate in the United Kingdom has
generated a great deal of controversy, with strong counterarguments
advanced on behalf of potential defendants and victims of coercive
control alike. Critics fear harm to potential victims for several reasons.
Some have argued that criminalizing coercive control will have the
perverse effect of reducing public awareness of its prevalence. For
example, due to the complexity of coercive control in reality, Professor
Julia Tolmie fears that the justice system will be unequipped to respond
to a sufficient number of cases, apart from those involving extreme
physical abuse.127 This, she worries, will give the false impression that
coercive control occurs rarely.128 Other scholars cite the existing
“patchy” enforcement numbers for the new statute to cast doubt on
law enforcement’s ability to translate clinical practice into the legal
124. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 477 (4th ed. 1994).
125. Bishop & Bettinson, Evidencing, supra note 122, at 15.
126. GEORGE FISHER, EVIDENCE 377 (3d ed. 2012) (listing “perception,” “memory,” and
“narration” as three of the four “testimonial capacities” in evidence law).
127. Julia R. Tolmie, Coercive Control: To Criminalize or Not To Criminalize?, 18
CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUST. 50, 50 (2018).
128. Id. at 60.
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context, which would prevent actual access to justice for most
victims.129
On the other side of the coin, it is a valid concern that—as was said
of the previously controversial stalking statutes and domestic violence
laws generally130—a party to a failing or otherwise acrimonious
relationship could take advantage of the apparent expansiveness of the
coercive control offense to use the criminal law as a weapon against
their partner. Even if a statute could be drafted in a way that fell short
of constitutional vagueness problems, the lack of a physical threat
requirement would seem to sweep into the statute’s potential ambit a
great deal of behavior we might not want to criminalize out of purely
liberty concerns. Or, even worse, it might create an incentive for a
partner seeking legal advantage in a divorce to make false accusations.
The evidentiary problems already discussed amplify these concerns.
III. SOLUTIONS IN OTHER SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSES
For all the many apparent legal problems associated with
criminalizing coercive control, the idea of nonphysical, nonpecuniary
criminal harm is hardly unknown to Western conceptions of justice. At
the most abstract level, the European Court of Human Rights has
interpreted the personal integrity provisions of the European
Convention on Human Rights to include protection against “moral
suffering and degrading treatment that creates a sense of fear, anxiety,
and inferiority in order to humiliate, degrade, and break the victim’s
resistance.”131 But we need not look to international conventions
around state misconduct for our only examples. This Part surveys the
other areas of American substantive criminal law relevant to legally

129. Sandra Walklate, Kate Fitz-Gibbon & Jude McCulloch, Is More Law the Answer?
Seeking Justice for Victims of Intimate Partner Violence Through the Reform of Legal Categories,
18 CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUST. 115, 118 (2018).
130. See, e.g., James Thomas Tucker, Stalking the Problems with Stalking Laws: The
Effectiveness of Florida Statutes Section 784.048, 45 FLA. L. REV. 609, 627 n.153 (1993) (stating
that an increase in protective orders in Florida in 1992 “was a result of three things: (1) battered
spouses have been educated about domestic violence; (2) the new domestic violence laws make it
easier to enforce the orders, encouraging their use; and (3) according to some defense attorneys,
‘estranged spouses are using domestic violence claims to bolster their divorce cases’” (citing Jill
Spitz, Domestic Violence Coming Out of the Closet, Into the Courtroom, ORLANDO SENTINEL
(Lake Sentinel ed.), May 30, 1993, at 1)).
131. Julie Lantrip, Torture and Cruel, Inhumane, and Degrading Treatment in the
Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 5 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 551, 552
(1999) (citing Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1975)).
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defining coercive control. Starting with the most clearly analogous
points of comparison—criminal emotional abuse of children and elders
and stalking—and moving into structurally analogous commercial and
financial crimes, this Part shows how American law has wrestled with
vagueness and overbreadth issues in ways that should inform a
legislature seeking to draft a coercive control offense.
A. Child and Elder Abuse
1. Child Abuse. Child abuse laws provide a seemingly relevant
model for a coercive control offense insofar as the legal concept of
child abuse has always included the category of pure emotional
abuse.132 In 1974, Congress passed the Child Abuse Prevention and
Treatment Act (“CAPTA”) which identified a minimum set of acts or
behaviors, including emotional abuse, which constitute legal child
abuse or neglect.133 Unlike general physical crimes such as assault,
which apply to everyone alike, CAPTA addresses a broader range of
abuse, both physical and nonphysical, but only when it happens to a
child at the hands of a “parent or caretaker.”134 Because CAPTA ties
federal grant money to states developing programs modeled after the
federal act, state child abuse laws have some basic features in
common.135 For example, the states all follow the federal requirement
that they designate certain individuals with regular professional
contact with children as “mandatory reporters” of suspected child
abuse.136
Although the precise substantive laws vary from state to state,
most recognize the four general categories of abuse designated in

132. See ANDREA J. SEDLAK & DIANE D. BROADHURST, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUM.
SERVS., THE THIRD NATIONAL INCIDENCE STUDY OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 215 (1996)
(listing three categories of emotional abuse).
133. Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (“CAPTA”), 42 U.S.C. § 5106g(2) (2018),
as amended by the Keeping Children and Families Safe Act of 2003 (defining child abuse and
neglect as “any recent act or failure to act on the part of a parent or caretaker, which results in
death, serious physical or emotional harm, sexual abuse or exploitation, or an act or failure to act
which presents an imminent risk of serious harm”).
134. Id.
135. See Mark R. Brown, Rescuing Children from Abusive Parents: The Constitutional Value
of Pre-Deprivation Process, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 913, 942–43 (2004) (listing child abuse–related
legislation that conditioned federal grants on development of programs to prevent child abuse).
136. Bridget A. Blinn, Focusing on Children: Providing Counsel to Children in Expedited
Proceedings To Terminate Parental Rights, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 789, 812 (2004).
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CAPTA: physical, sexual, neglect, and emotional.137 Unlike physical
abuse, definitions of “emotional abuse” vary quite widely. Some states
simply define “child abuse” to include the causing of “emotional harm”
or “mental injury,” without further elaboration.138 However, the codes
of approximately thirty-three states provide specific definitions of
emotional or mental child abuse.139 The overwhelming majority define
emotional abuse in terms of the provable injury to the child. Typically,
“injury to the psychological capacity or emotional stability of the child
as evidenced by an observable or substantial change in behavior,
emotional response, or cognition” and “injury as evidenced by ‘anxiety,
depression, withdrawal, or aggressive behavior.’”140 Some states even
write the requirement of professional diagnosis into the definition of
the offense, as with Alaska’s requirement that the existence of a
“mental injury” be “supported by the opinion of a qualified expert
witness.”141
Critics have pointed out that this legal focus on medically
observable harm in the victim, rather than on the abuser’s conduct, has
allowed recognizably egregious abusers to go unpunished when the
government could not show a visible effect on the child.142 (And this
despite the fact that even an influential report from the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) identified
“[v]erbal or [e]motional [a]ssault” as a form of emotional abuse, and
defined it purely in terms of the abuser’s conduct: “[h]abitual patterns
of belittling, denigrating, scapegoating, or other . . . forms of overtly
hostile or rejecting treatment.”143) The documented evidentiary
problems caused by the harm-based definition of emotional child abuse
137. Shauneen M. Garrahan & Andrew W. Eichner, Tipping the Scale: A Place for Childhood
Obesity in the Evolving Legal Framework of Child Abuse and Neglect, 12 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y
& ETHICS 336, 351–52 (2012) (citing R. KIM OATES, THE SPECTRUM OF CHILD ABUSE 2 (1996)).
138. See U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., CHILD.’S BUREAU, DEFINITIONS OF CHILD
ABUSE AND NEGLECT 3 (2019), https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/define.pdf [https://
perma.cc/Q2G3-PKCM].
139. Id.
140. See generally id. (collecting all state definitions of child abuse).
141. ALASKA STAT. § 47.17.290 (2019).
142. See J. Robert Shull, Emotional and Psychological Child Abuse: Notes on Discourse,
History, and Change, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1665, 1665–68 (1999) (recounting two such cases, one in
which a mother forced her thirteen-year-old daughter to eat hot peppers as a punishment for
lying, cut off her hair, and chained her to a tree for three days; and another in which a mother
locked her thirteen-year-old daughter in a closet for seventeen hours, naked, without food or
water, and only a bucket for a bathroom).
143. Sedlak & Broadhurst, supra note 132, at 2–15.
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support the criticism, discussed in Part II.B, of the “serious effect”
element of the U.K. coercive control statute, which depends on
potentially traumatized victims being able to testify about harms they
may not be able to narrate coherently.
A handful of states, however, have adopted some version of a
conduct-based definition of emotional child abuse. Connecticut’s code
states that abuse includes “emotional maltreatment,” which appears
conduct based, though the law provides no definition of
maltreatment.144 A few states include in the offense not only emotional
injury but the threat of such injury, which eases the requirement of
medical proof. For example, Illinois defines abuse to include
“impairment of . . . emotional health” or “substantial risk of . . .
impairment of . . . emotional health.”145 The only state to adopt a clear
conduct-based definition of emotional child abuse is Delaware, which
defines it as “threats to inflict undue physical or emotional harm, and/
or chronic or recurring incidents of ridiculing, demeaning, making
derogatory remarks or cursing.”146
The legal recognition of emotional child abuse has posed some
challenges, similar to those arising with coercive control. Like the
physical and mental harms of coercive control in domestic
relationships, the effects of emotional abuse on children are well
documented.147 Yet, the psychological literature also suggests society
tends to focus on the physical realm as more important than the
psychological, and even clinicians prioritize actual or threatened
physical injury.148 Furthermore, as with coercive control and domestic
violence generally, critics of child abuse laws point out the risk that
false claims of emotional child abuse will arise as parents try to win
custody disputes.149
144. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-120(5)(C) (2020).
145. 325 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/3 (2020).
146. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 901(10) (2020).
147. See Peter Thomas, Protection, Dissociation, and Internal Roles: Modeling and Treating
the Effects of Child Abuse, 7 REV. GEN. PSYCH. 364, 366 (2003) (reporting that 80 percent of
young adults who were emotionally abused as children are not successful at psychosocial
functioning).
148. See, e.g., Lynn Sorsoli, Hurt Feelings: Emotional Abuse and the Failure of Empathy, 4 J.
EMOTIONAL ABUSE 1, 3 (2004); James A. Twaite & Ofelia Rodriguez-Srednicki, Understanding
and Reporting Child Abuse: Legal and Psychological Perspective: Part Two: Emotional Abuse and
Secondary Abuse, 32 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 443, 444 (2004).
149. See Robert W. Kerns, Crying Wolf: The Use of False Accusations of Abuse To Influence
Child Custodianship and a Proposal To Protect the Innocent, 56 S. TEX. L. REV. 603, 607 (2015)
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With this backdrop, coupled with the varying, vague, and
underinclusive legal definitions of emotional abuse, it is unsurprising
that the reporting rates of emotional child abuse vary wildly across the
country, especially when compared with reporting rates for physical or
sexual abuse, which remain relatively consistent from state to state.150
A 2007 report from the Administration for Children and Families at
HHS found that on cases of abuse initiated by mandatory reporters,
eight states recorded emotional abuse in 10–20 percent of child abuse
cases, ten states in less than 10 percent, and twenty-four states in less
than 1 percent, while five reported no cases of emotional abuse at all.151
2. Elder Abuse. Historical accident has linked the legal response
to child abuse to the distinct problem of elder abuse, which attracted
public concern after a 1981 congressional report drew national
attention to the issue.152 Legislators responded using the recently
adopted child abuse statutes as models for elder abuse statutes,
meaning that the elder abuse legislation largely follows the mandatory
reporting model of CAPTA and its state progeny.153 Professor Joseph
Barber argues that such a model is inappropriate for elder abuse
because, first, elderly adults are more socially isolated than children;
second, elders should be accorded a higher degree of respect
concerning their self-determination; and third, elder abuse is difficult
to diagnose.154 He further argues that elder abuse should be treated
more like domestic violence, due to the shared characteristics of the
cycle of violence and dynamic of power and control between abuser
and victim, involving—in both cases—fear of humiliation and shame
that causes victims not to report.155 Barber’s solution is increased

(citing Hollida Wakefield & Ralph Underwager, Sexual Abuse Allegations in Divorce and
Custody Disputes, 9 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 451, 452–53 (1991), which estimates the occurrence of false
accusations of child sexual abuse as between 20 and 80 percent).
150. Andrew Ford, Note, State Child Emotional Abuse Laws: Their Failure To Protect
Children with Gender Identity Disorder, 49 FAM. CT. REV. 642, 643 (2011).
151. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., ADMIN. ON CHILD., YOUTH & FAMS., CHILD
MALTREATMENT 43–44 (2007), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/cm07.pdf [https://
perma.cc/7WTD-XU4N].
152. See Audrey S. Garfield, Note, Elder Abuse and the States’ Adult Protective Services
Response: Time for a Change in California, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 859, 869 (1991).
153. See Joseph W. Barber, Note, The Kids Aren’t All Right: The Failure of Child Abuse
Statutes as a Model for Elder Abuse Statutes, 16 ELDER L.J. 107, 116 (2008).
154. Id. at 120.
155. Id. at 124
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penalties for abusers and efforts to empower victims to change their
situations themselves.156 Although his proposal does not distinguish
between physical and emotional abuse and the unique legal issues
surrounding the latter, it underscores the potential sociological
relationship between elder abuse and domestic coercive control.
Like the child abuse statutes they model, however, elder abuse
statutes typically define emotional abuse by the observable mental
injury to the victim, rather than by offender conduct. The familiar
challenges for prosecutors of an injury-based standard are, if anything,
most marked in the elder abuse context, as many elderly patients suffer
from conditions such as Alzheimer’s disease, dementia, or strokes.
These patients often cannot remember or understand their abuse.157 In
1992, Vermont Attorney General Jeffrey L. Amestoy stated in an
official report that the definition of elder abuse “is so vague and
difficult to prove that [his office] has never brought charges under this
statute” and urged legislators to redraft it to “incorporate the concepts
of cruelty and mistreatment.”158 Like its child abuse statute, Delaware’s
definition of elder abuse is directed at abusive conduct rather than
injury, and includes:
a pattern of emotional abuse, which includes, but is not limited to,
ridiculing or demeaning an adult who is impaired making derogatory
remarks to an adult who is impaired or cursing or threatening to inflict
physical or emotional harm on an adult who is impaired.159

The Delaware statute aside, most state elder abuse statutes would
appear to raise similar practical shortcomings as potential models for a
coercive control offense.
3. Constitutional Problems. Both child and elder abuse statutes
have faced constitutional challenges to their emotional abuse
provisions on the grounds of vagueness and overbreadth. The Nevada
Supreme Court held facially void for vagueness a statute making it a
misdemeanor to “annoy[] or molest[] a minor,” due to the lack of

156. Id. at 131.
157. Robert Polisky, Criminalizing Physical and Emotional Elder Abuse, 3 ELDER L.J. 377,
395 (1995).
158. Id. at 395–96 (citing JEFFREY L. AMESTOY, ATT’Y GEN., STATE OF VT., OFF. OF ATT’Y
GEN., PEOPLE IN NEED OF CARE: A POPULATION AT RISK 8 (1992)).
159. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 31, § 3902(1) (2020).
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specificity as to what sorts of annoying behaviors were prohibited.160
By contrast, the Florida Supreme Court held that Florida’s criminal
child abuse statute, which prohibited, among other things, the
“intentional infliction of . . . mental injury upon a child” did not render
it unconstitutionally vague, even though “mental injury” was not
defined.161 The court relied on the fact that Florida law elsewhere, in
its child welfare provisions, defines “mental injury” as “an injury to the
intellectual or psychological capacity of a child as evidenced by a
discernible and substantial impairment in his ability to function within
his normal range of performance and behavior,” which should put a
defendant on notice of the sorts of mental injuries the child abuse
statute includes.162 The court also noted that such injury “will be
present only in limited circumstances” and, thus, will not encourage
arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement.163
However, to avoid overbreadth problems, a Florida court of
appeal construed the same statute as inapplicable to mental injury
caused by speech of any kind, because the statute’s prohibition could
otherwise extend to speech protected under the First Amendment.164
Coming to the opposite conclusion, a New York family court held that
mere words were sufficient to constitute child abuse under the child
welfare laws, provided they cause a physical injury to the child that falls
within the language of the statute—in this case, a fourteen-year-old
boy’s stomach pains caused by his father’s repeated verbal attacks on
his sexuality.165 The court noted, however, the civil nature of the family
court proceeding as relevant to this interpretation.166
Those cases, of course, involved the more common, injury-based
definition of emotional abuse. In Robinson v. State,167 the Delaware
Supreme Court considered vagueness and overbreadth challenges to
Delaware’s conduct-based definition.168 In this case, the defendant

160. City of Las Vegas v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Court, 59 P.3d 477, 479 (Nev. 2002) (quoting 1995
Nev. Stat. 1240).
161. Dufresne v. State, 826 So. 2d 272, 273–74 (Fla. 2002) (quoting FLA. STAT. § 827.03(1)
(Supp. 1996)).
162. Id. at 276, 279 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 827.04(2) (1977)).
163. Id. at 278.
164. Munao v. State, 939 So. 2d 125, 127–28 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
165. In re Shane T., 115 Misc. 2d 161, 164 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1982).
166. Id.
167. Robinson v. State, 600 A.2d 356 (Del. 1991).
168. Id. at 362.
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challenged the constitutionality of the Delaware patient abuse statute,
a precursor to the elder abuse statute, with nearly identical language
prohibiting “ridiculing or demeaning a patient or resident, making
derogatory remarks to a patient or resident or cursing directed towards
a patient or resident.”169 The court rejected the challenge on both
grounds, though largely for reasons related to the statute’s specific
application to patient victims.
On the overbreadth claim the court applied First Amendment
precedent on “captive” audiences, which requires courts to balance the
defendant’s free speech right against the government’s interest in
protecting the privacy rights of those, such as homeowners, who cannot
avoid the speech.170 (In the patient setting, the victims are captive due
to the necessity of seeking in-patient or at-home medical care).171 On
the vagueness claim the court found it dispositive that the statute only
protects patients and residents of facilities, and only against prohibited
acts that occur within the facilities (along with the facts that the statute
punishes only “knowing[]” violations and defines “ridiculing” or
“demeaning” according to an objective standard).172 For these reasons,
the court held that the patient abuse statute defined the offense of
emotional abuse with sufficient definiteness such that ordinary people
can understand what conduct is prohibited.173
The current state of child and elder emotional abuse law thus
raises both pragmatic and constitutional problems likely to be
amplified in the context of coercive control. First off, it is easy to see
why the U.K. Parliament chose such pliable language to define the
harm element of coercive control: even with the testimonial limitations
of traumatized victims, prosecutors may have a somewhat easier time
proving that abuse had a “substantial effect” on a victim than they do
proving a clinical emotional or mental injury under American abuse
law. Yet it is precisely this tough definition of harm that the Florida
Supreme Court relied on in rejecting the vagueness challenge to the
emotional abuse offense. The fact that such significant mental injuries
will be “present only in limited circumstances” is why the court held
the statute will not encourage discriminatory or arbitrary enforcement.

169. Polisky, supra note 157, at 397 n.133, 403 (quoting DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 1131(1)
(Michie Supp. 1994)).
170. Robinson, 600 A.2d at 364.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 365.
173. Id. at 366.
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In other words, if an emotional abuse statute relies on a precise
definition of observable mental injury it may pass constitutional muster
but be ineffective. Furthermore, to the limited extent they have
weighed in on the issue, courts seem divided over the question of
whether the abuse statutes criminalizing pure speech that causes
emotional injury can pass overbreadth scrutiny, which would eliminate
a lot of conduct a coercive control statute should target. These
problems, alone, should give legislators pause before turning to
emotional abuse under these laws as a model for coercive control.
It should also be noted that, even if child and elder emotional
abuse laws themselves withstand future vagueness and overbreadth
challenges, their power as a foundation for a coercive control offense
may be limited. Like CAPTA, most state child abuse laws target
caregivers and parents, who already have a heightened duty of care to
their charges under the negligence laws of most jurisdictions. Parental
and caregiving relationships already give rise to unique duties under
the common law. For example, while it is a general principle that
people cannot be prosecuted for their merely immoral omissions to
render assistance, the existence of a particular family relationship
between two parties is one of the common law exceptions to that rule
that creates a duty to rescue and, thus, a basis for culpable homicide by
omission.174 A similar heightened duty of care exists in the case of
undertakings, such as when professionals care for the well-being of
elderly patients.175 It may be relevant for due process purposes that
child and elder abuse laws affect primarily people in these existing legal
classes.
That said, it is further relevant that the law also generally
recognizes a parallel spouse-to-spouse duty of care, which means that
if a husband “realizes (or culpably fails to realize) his wife is in danger,
realizes (or culpably fails to realize) that he can rescue her with
minimal risk and/or sacrifice, and realizes (or culpably fails to realize)
that she is his wife,” then he can be liable for criminal homicide.176 Thus
spouses, caretakers, and parents all technically fall into the same
category when it comes to the law recognizing heightened duties of
care, at least in the realm of negligent homicide. This may suggest that

174. See Jones v. United States, 308 F.2d 307, 310 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
175. Id.
176. Larry Alexander, Criminal Liability for Omissions: An Inventory of Issues, in CRIMINAL
LAW THEORY: DOCTRINES OF THE GENERAL PART 121, 139 (Stephen Shute & A. P. Simester
eds., 2002) (emphasis omitted).
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a coercive control statute that imposes a duty between spouses to avoid
causing emotional harm may pose, at least, no greater due process
problems than the parallel parent–child and caretaker–elder duties
embodied in the child and elder abuse laws. Yet it is unclear that the
existence of these heightened, relational duties to rescue from physical
harm translate into the realm of emotional harm, such as to negate all
vagueness and overbreadth problems associated with punishing
emotional child, elder, or spousal abuse. And in any case, courts are
already reluctant to recognize even the traditional duty-to-rescue as a
basis for negligent homicide in cases involving unmarried romantic
partners, which many victims of coercive control are.177
It may be the Delaware Supreme Court’s analysis in the Robinson
case that best illustrates the danger of assuming a legislature could
simply expand child or elder emotional abuse law to cover cases of
coercive control between intimate partners. The Robinson court,
remember, rejected the defendant’s overbreadth challenge on the
“captive audience” grounds, based on the fact that a patient—like a
homeowner—cannot escape offensive speech, and the defendant lacks
an unrestrained First Amendment right to impose it under those
circumstances. That argument can readily be extended to children and,
at least, infirm elders, who by virtue of their intrinsic status lack the
independence to leave an emotionally abusive situation. One could try
to argue, similarly, that an emotionally abused partner is often
psychologically incapable of leaving a coercively controlling
relationship. Such a theory, however, presupposes the issue in
question. It would certainly violate due process to limit a defendant’s
constitutional objections due to the presumed existence of exactly the
state of affairs for which he is being prosecuted in the first place. In
short, the potential due process issues around emotional abuse, which
courts have not fully resolved as to child and elder abuse law, would
likely be amplified if similarly worded legislation applied to intimate
partners.
B. Stalking
As mentioned above, stalking, a form of harassment, is a criminal
offense of relatively recent vintage that is similar to coercive control
insofar as they both target patterns of conduct someone engages in to
177. See Jennifer M. Collins, Ethan J. Leib & Dan Markel, Punishing Family Status, 88 B.U.
L. REV. 1327, 1336–37 (2008).
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impose himself or herself mentally on another person.178 (The typical
state criminal code now defines stalking as the intentional, repeated
following of a person for the purpose of harassing them.179) Most
stalking statutes contain an element of physical threat of violence or
death,180 thereby placing them squarely within the “true threats”
exception to the First Amendment.181 However, at least nine
jurisdictions provide for stalking liability on a showing that the
defendant has caused the victim some form of emotional distress.182

178. See discussion of stalking in supra notes 105–10. The most obvious difference, of course,
being that the paradigmatic case of stalking involves strangers, acquaintances, or former intimate
partners, whereas coercive control explicitly involves ongoing personal relationships.
179. Stalking, in NATIONAL SURVEY OF STATE LAWS 923 (Richard A. Leiter, ed.).
180. Id.
181. See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003).
182. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-602(1)(c) (2019) (listing as a form of stalking
“knowingly . . . [r]epeatedly follow[ing], approach[ing], contact[ing], plac[ing] under surveillance,
or mak[ing] any form of communication with another person or [listed others] in a manner that
would cause a reasonable person to suffer serious emotional distress and does cause [such
distress]”); D.C. CODE § 22-3133(a)(2) (2020) (listing as a form of stalking “purposefully
engag[ing] in course of conduct directed at a specific individual . . . [t]hat the person knows [or
should have known] would cause that individual reasonably to[] [f]ear for his or her safety or the
safety of another person[,] [f]eel seriously alarmed, disturbed, or frightened[,] or [s]uffer
emotional distress”); IDAHO CODE § 18-7906(1) (2020) (defining second-degree stalking as
“[k]nowingly and maliciously[] engag[ing] in a course of conduct that seriously alarms, annoys or
harasses the victim and is such as would cause a reasonable person substantial emotional distress[]
or . . . fear of death or physical injury [to self], or . . . a family or household member”); 720 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/12-7.3(a) (2020) (defining stalking as knowing engagement in a course of conduct
directed at a specific person knowing it would cause a reasonable person to fear for safety of self
or a third person or to suffer other emotional distress); LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:40.2.A (2020)
(defining misdemeanor stalking as “the intentional and repeated following or harassing . . . that
would cause a reasonable person to feel alarmed or to suffer emotional distress”); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 17-A, § 210-A(1) (2019) (listing as a definition of stalking “intentionally or knowingly
engag[ing] in a course of conduct directed at . . . a specific person that would cause a reasonable
person[] to suffer serious inconvenience or emotional distress”); MO. REV. STAT. § 565.225(2)
(2017) (defining first-degree stalking as “purposely, through his or her course of conduct,
disturb[ing], or follow[ing] with the intent of disturbing another person”); MONT. CODE ANN. §
45-5-220(1) (2019) (defining stalking as purposely or knowingly causing another substantial
emotional distress or reasonable apprehension of bodily injury or death by repeatedly following
the person or harassing, threatening, or intimidating him or her in person or by mail, electronic
communication or any other method); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.45 (Consol. 2020) (listing, as
fourth-degree stalking: “intentionally, and for no legitimate purpose, engag[ing] in a course of
conduct . . . [when one] knows or reasonably should know that such conduct . . . causes material
harm to the mental or emotional health of [a] person, where such conduct consists of following,
telephoning or initiating communication or contact with such person, a member of such person’s
immediate family or a third party with whom such person is acquainted, and the actor was
previously clearly informed to cease that conduct”); UTAH ADMIN. CODE r. 76-5-106.5(2) (2020)
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Many of these provisions have withstood vagueness or First
Amendment overbreadth challenges in state appellate courts.183 They
would therefore seem to provide examples of more precise statutory
language that might remove some of the constitutionally problematic
ambiguity from the U.K. definition of coercive control.
For example, Colorado defines stalking as: “knowingly . . .
[r]epeatedly follow[ing], approach[ing], contact[ing], plac[ing] under
surveillance, or mak[ing] any form of communication with another
person . . . in a manner that would cause a reasonable person to suffer
serious emotional distress and does cause” such distress.184 This would
appear to criminalize the knowing act of communication itself
assuming objectively reasonable emotional distress results. In a
vagueness challenge to this provision the Colorado Supreme Court
found that
[e]ven though a person is not required to actually know that his or her
acts towards the victim are not innocuous, [the law] is not vague
because a reasonable person could know that the only acts prohibited
are those that would cause a reasonable person to suffer serious
emotional distress and do in fact cause such distress.185

The court then held the offense was not constitutionally vague because
it connects a defendant’s acts “to both an objective standard and a
palpable result” and because it “does not criminalize innocuous
behavior.”186
New York defines fourth-degree stalking as
intentionally, and for no legitimate purpose, engag[ing] in a course of
conduct [that the defendant] knows or reasonably should know . . .
(making it a class A misdemeanor to intentionally or knowingly cause a reasonable person to fear
for him/herself or a third person or to suffer other emotional distress).
183. See, e.g., Beachum v. United States, 197 A.3d 508, 510–11 (D.C. 2018) (holding a statute
requiring “the defendant ‘should have known’ that the defendant’s conduct ‘would cause a
reasonable person in the individual’s circumstances’ to suffer fear, serious alarm, or emotional
distress” constitutional); State v. Dean, No. 43201, 2016 Ida. App. Unpub. LEXIS 539, at *20
(Idaho Ct. App. Jan. 27, 2016); State v. Elliott, 987 A.2d 513, 519 (Me. 2010); State v.
Schleiermacher, 924 S.W.2d 269, 276 (Mo. 1996) (en banc) (“A word or phrase is not
unconstitutionally vague merely because of some ambiguity.”); State v. Adgerson, 78 P.3d 850,
856 (Mont. 2003) (“[S]talking another person is not constitutionally protected behavior.”); State
v. Weisberg, 62 P.3d 457, 461 (Utah Ct. App. 2002) (rejecting the defendant’s overbreadth and
vagueness arguments).
184. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-602(1)(c) (2019).
185. People v. Cross, 127 P.3d 71, 78 (Colo. 2006).
186. Id.
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[will] cause[] material harm to the mental or emotional health of [a]
person, where such conduct consists of following, telephoning or
initiating communication or contact with such person . . . and the actor
was previously clearly informed to cease that conduct.187

Although the New York statute contains the added element that
the defendant has been previously told to desist, like Colorado’s
version it imposes liability in cases where “communication” causes
mental or emotional harm.188 In rejecting a vagueness challenge to this
provision, in which the defendant primarily challenged the “no
legitimate purpose” language, a New York appeals court pointed to the
ways in which the various elements of the offense worked together to
create the constitutionally requisite specificity.189 The court noted that
the offense contains an intent requirement as to the conduct itself, such
that “[t]o be convicted, the person must have intended to engage in a
course of conduct targeted at a specific individual” and could not be
guilty of stalking through accidental conduct.190
Applying its precedent from a similarly structured statute
criminalizing “jostling,” the court further held that the prosecution
need not prove that the defendant intended that the conduct have the
particular effect of causing emotional distress.191 Rather, the court
concluded, the stalking statute prohibited “a certain intentional course
of conduct regardless of the wrongdoer’s underlying purpose or
motive.”192 Nonetheless, the court held that the “no legitimate
purpose” language combined with the lack of specific intent element
as to motive did not render the crime unconstitutionally vague. The
statute, the court said, “contains lucid provisos clearly applicable to
defendant’s conduct: The course of conduct must be intentional; it
must be aimed at a specific person; and the offender must know (or
have reason to know) that his conduct will (or likely will) instill
reasonable fear of material harm in the victim.”193 Notably, the court
accepted without comment the fact that fear of pure emotional harm
would suffice to meet the elements of the offense.

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.45.
Id. § 120.45(2).
People v. Stuart, 797 N.E.2d 28, 39 (N.Y. 2003).
Id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting People v. Nelson, 69 N.Y.2d 302, 303 (1987)).
Id. at 41.
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Not all stalking offenses have fared so well in state court, however.
Illinois courts have held the emotional distress–based provisions of the
Illinois stalking statute to be unconstitutionally overbroad. In People
v. Relerford,194 the Illinois Supreme Court struck down a provision
making it a crime knowingly to “communicate[] to or about” a specific
person two or more times where the defendant knows or should know
the communications would cause a reasonable person to suffer
emotional distress.195 The court found that the statute reached “a vast
array of circumstances that limit speech far beyond the generally
understood meaning of stalking,” criminalized “a host of social
interactions that a person would find distressing but are clearly
understood to fall within the protections of the first amendment,” and
was thus facially overbroad.196 As the court noted, “The phrase
‘communicates to or about’ was stricken from the Stalking Statute, and
the remaining provisions were left intact.”197 These included a
provision making it criminal stalking for a person to “knowingly
‘threaten[]’ a specific person two or more times when he or she knows
or should know that the threats would cause a reasonable person to
suffer emotional distress.”198
In People v. Morocho,199 the Illinois Appellate Court considered
an appeal from conviction under this “threat”-based portion of the
offense and found that it, too, was unconstitutionally overbroad. The
court stated:
Many times a person who twice threatens lawful action unrelated
to violence and actually intends to trigger distress of another for the
purpose of motivation is not a criminal stalker; he or she is an
ordinary member of society engaged in any number of expressive
actions attendant to everyday social, business, legal, and political
interaction. Such motivational threats are constitutionally protected;
“true threats” are not.200

The court went on to note that unlike “true threats”—with their
implicit reference to physical violence—many threats that cause

194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

People v. Relerford, 104 N.E.3d 341 (Ill. 2017).
Id. at 349 (construing 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12–7.3(a), (c) (West 2012)).
Id. at 353–54.
People v. Morocho, 132 N.E.3d 806, 811 (Ill. App. Ct. 2019).
Id. at 810–11.
People v. Morocho, 132 N.E.3d 806 (Ill. App. Ct. 2019).
Id. at 813 (emphasis in original).
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emotional distress may in fact serve valuable social purposes like those
protected by the communicative purpose of the First Amendment.201 It
observed that “[t]hreats can be proper motivating tools” as in cases of
coaches threatening players with benching if they do not play defense,
parents threatening their children with no dessert, a lender or agent
threatening foreclosure.202 “Under subsection (a)(2),” the court noted,
“such threats, if construed to cause significant distress, anxiety, or
alarm, carry felony criminal liability.”203 The court also noted that the
statute could chill a core form of political speech, in the case of an
activist “who decides not to attend a town hall meeting because
repeatedly threatening to bring a polluting business owner’s operations
to a halt with a boycott or injunction could result in arrest.”204
The case law developing around the newer offenses of
“cyberstalking” and “cyber-harassment”—intended to protect victims
from online bullying—raises further concerns about the
constitutionality of emotional harm–based stalking laws. For example,
the Minnesota Supreme Court recently invalidated that state’s
cyberstalking statute as facially invalid on overbreadth grounds.205 The
statute prohibited “stalking” by “repeatedly mail[ing] or deliver[ing]
or caus[ing] the delivery by any means, including electronically, of
letters, telegrams, messages, packages . . . or any communication made
through any available technologies or other objects,”206 and defined
“stalking” as engaging
in conduct which the actor knows or has reason to know would cause
the victim under the circumstances to feel frightened, threatened,
oppressed, persecuted, or intimidated, and causes this reaction on the
part of the victim regardless of the relationship between the actor and
victim.207

The court struck down this statute as overbroad due to the lack of
specific intent element and the fact that it covers “every type of
communication without limitation.”208 In the same case, the court also

201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
In re Welfare of A.J.B., 929 N.W.2d 840, 844 (Minn. 2019).
MINN. STAT. § 609.749(2)(6) (2019).
Id. § 609.749(1).
Welfare of A.J.B., 929 N.W.2d at 849.
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partially invalidated the more serious “cyberharassment” statute which
made it a crime to “repeatedly mail[] or deliver[] or cause[] the delivery
by any means, including electronically, of letters, telegrams, or
packages,” even though that offense does require the specific intent to
“abuse, disturb, or cause distress.”209 For that offense, the court severed
“disturb” and “cause distress” as overbroad, thereby narrowing the
mens rea element to “intent to abuse.” In so holding the court observed
that acts of political speech such as “[d]elivering a letter that tells an
elected official that the sender will take action to defeat him in the next
election if he does not take action on gun control” could certainly be
done with the intent to disturb and/or cause distress.210 The court
concluded, therefore, that because such speech is clearly protected by
the First Amendment, a law that criminalizes mailing or delivering a
letter that disturbs or causes distress will have a substantial chilling
effect on protected speech and expressive conduct.211
To date, Illinois and Minnesota appear to be the only states in
which courts have spoken so directly on the question of pure emotional
distress as a basis for stalking liability. In the general absence of case
law directly addressing the question and coming to the opposite
conclusion, it would seem that a legislative effort to criminalize a
pattern of conduct that reasonably results in emotional distress, in the
absence of threats of violence, may be constitutionally suspect on
overbreadth grounds, even when written precisely enough to survive a
vagueness challenge. It would also seem that any effort to fashion a
coercive control offense in the domestic context should try to avoid the
overbreadth questions that arise when statutory text ties liability purely
to the emotional reaction the conduct elicits from the victim.
C. False Imprisonment
In a well-argued student note, Alexandra Ortiz suggests a wholly
different statutory framework as a means of adapting the U.K. coercive
control offense to the American constitutional order.212 Ortiz uses the
emphasis placed by Stark and other scholars of coercive control on the

209. MINN. STAT. § 609.795(1).
210. Welfare of A.J.B., 929 N.W.2d at 862. Indeed, the court pointed out that the point of such
speech is “often precisely to cause distress, strain, anxiety, or suffering in order to prompt action.”
Id.
211. Id.
212. Ortiz, supra note 18, at 703.
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extent to which it is an offense against the victim’s liberty to argue that
the state of Tennessee should amend its false imprisonment offense to
capture coercive control.213 Specifically, she argues that a revised false
imprisonment crime might target such liberty-impinging behaviors as
controlling a person’s movements, isolating them from friends and
family, depriving them of basic needs or access to services, maintaining
control over their assets, or otherwise—as suggested by the U.K.
Statutory Guidance—“taking control over aspects of their everyday
life, such as where they can go, who they can see, what to wear, and
when they can sleep.”214
Ortiz discusses the Tennessee Criminal Code’s provision that “[a]
person commits the offense of false imprisonment who knowingly
removes or confines another unlawfully so as to interfere substantially
with the other’s liberty.”215 She suggests that this definition be amended
to prohibit “[a] course of conduct involving intentional, knowing,
reckless, or negligent repeated or continuing harassment, intimidation,
exploitation, humiliation, isolation, and/or control, directed toward a
person with whom the perpetrator has a personal connection, which
interferes substantially with that person’s liberty and autonomy.”216
She defines “autonomy” as “the freedom to make personal decisions
on a day-to-day basis” and notes that the word “substantially” ensures
that the deprivation of liberty would not need to be so complete for the
elements of the offense to be met.217
It would seem that the language of this offense could potentially
criminalize some of the same sorts of speech the Illinois and Minnesota
Supreme Courts found to be constitutionally protected and, thus,
overbroad. For example, one could imagine someone “negligently
harassing” a person through purely communicative words and deeds in
a way that interfered with that person’s autonomy, if the mechanism of
the interference was the victim’s fear of causing displeasure. But the
focus on the autonomy and liberty interests at stake in the false
imprisonment offense is an improvement on the emotional distress–
based element of stalking offenses.
213. Id. at 703–04.
214. Id. at 704 (quoting HOME OFF., CONTROLLING OR COERCIVE BEHAVIOUR IN AN
INTIMATE OR FAMILY RELATIONSHIP: STATUTORY GUIDANCE FRAMEWORK 4 (2015), https://
www.gov.uk/government/publications/statutory-guidance-framework-controlling-or-coercivebehaviour-in-an-intimate-or-family-relationship [https://perma.cc/P79V-ZD5A]).
215. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-302 (2017).
216. Ortiz, supra note 18, at 707–08.
217. Id. at 708.
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D. Blackmail
Another pair of crimes that potentially punish coercive, expressive
conduct are the related offenses of blackmail and extortion. In most
jurisdictions “blackmail” is defined as “gaining or attempting to gain
anything of value or compelling another to act against such person’s
will, by threatening to communicate accusations or statements” that
would subject the person to some form of embarrassment or public
ridicule.218 “Extortion,” by contrast, is using the threat of future
violence or some other unlawful act to extract something from a
victim.219 Traditionally extortion involves the demand of property but
may also involve a demand that the victim perform an act or refrain
from performing an act he or she has the right to do. Some jurisdictions
treat this latter category of act/omission-motivated extortion as the
separate crime of “coercion.”220 Some states actually treat blackmail as
a particular type of extortion, with the blackmailing conduct forming
the unlawful act element.221 In general, traditional “extortion” offenses
are legally noncontroversial insofar as the extortionist threatens
consequences that are in and of themselves illegal.222 Blackmail,
however, is unique insofar as—like the communications of the stalker
who causes emotional distress as discussed in Part III.B or those of the
hypothetical coercive controller who achieves his goal through words
rather than blows—the blackmailer’s threatened communications
might otherwise be a perfectly legal exercise of free speech.

218. See Paul H. Robinson, Michael T. Cahill & Daniel M. Bartels, Competing Theories of
Blackmail: An Empirical Research Critique of Criminal Law Theory, 89 TEX. L. REV. 291, 308–
13 n.90 (2010) (surveying the variations between state definitions of blackmail). States vary on
whether the offense of blackmail requires demands for property or includes demands that a victim
engage in or refrain from action; whether it requires a threat to reveal information or whether it
also extends to threats to perform other lawful but unwelcome acts; whether it contains no
exceptions or permits the offense under specified circumstances; and whether “blackmail” is its
own offense or a subset of more general offenses such as extortion, criminal “threats,” theft,
larceny, or coercion. Peter Westen, Why the Paradox of Blackmail Is So Hard To Resolve, 9 OHIO
ST. J. CRIM. L. 585, 590 (2012).
219. Robinson et al., supra note 218, at 293.
220. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 163.275(1) (2017) (defining coercion as “compel[ling] or
induc[ing] another person to engage in conduct from which the other person has a legal right to
abstain, or to abstain from engaging in conduct in which the other person has a legal right to
engage”); see also N.Y. PENAL LAW § 135.60 (Consol. 2020).
221. See Westen, supra note 218, at 590 (noting that some commentators use “threat” to refer
to biconditionals in the context of extortion).
222. See Robinson et al., supra note 218, at 293 (defining extortion as an uncontroversial
category of crime involving threats of criminal acts).
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Commentators have therefore frequently described blackmail as
“paradoxical,” as its official meaning is difficult to square with public
intuitions about what sorts of conduct should be criminal.223
Specifically, the paradox flows from the fact that blackmail punishes
“the act of obtaining or attempting to obtain something of value from
persons by offering in return to do something that is noncriminal (i.e.,
withhold incriminating or embarrassing information) under the threat
of otherwise doing something that is also noncriminal (i.e., disclose
information that can be lawfully commodified and sold for the actor’s
personal gain).”224 Some scholars argue that, for this reason, blackmail
should be treated identically to any other commercial transaction—
that “[b]oth parties gain from a voluntary trade, and this is as true of
the exchange of money for silence as it is for any other case.”225
Although this proposition is difficult to squarely refute as a logical
matter, it has not been accepted by courts, which treat blackmail as an
obvious exception to the free speech right.226 Furthermore, the
theoretical unattractiveness of decriminalization is clear from the
wealth of scholarly criticism attempting to provide a theoretical basis
for criminalizing blackmail. The weight of consensus is that blackmail
must be punished despite the very clear First Amendment problems
with doing so.
No less formidable proponents of the free market than legal
scholars Richard Posner and Richard Epstein have rejected the
legalization of blackmail on consequentialist grounds. Posner argues
that, in situations in which the blackmailer reveals information that is
already criminal or tortious it constitutes, essentially, either
223. See, e.g., Westen, supra note 218, at 585–86, 604 n.77 (describing and problematizing the
“intuition” that extorted parties in blackmail are always moral victims rather than accomplices).
224. See id. at 595 (“[B]lackmail appears to consist of the very things that render commercial
exchange noncriminal . . . .”); see also James Lindgren, Unraveling the Paradox of Blackmail, 84
COLUM. L. REV. 670, 671 (1984) (“If both a person’s ends—seeking a job or money—and his
means—threatening to expose—are otherwise legal, why is it illegal to combine them?”).
225. Walter Block & David Gordon, Blackmail, Extortion and Free Speech: A Reply to
Posner, Epstein, Nozick and Lindgren, 19 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 37, 39 (1986).
226. See, e.g., Gresham v. Peterson, 225 F.3d 899, 909 (7th Cir. 2000) (collecting cases holding
that the government “may proscribe threats, extortion, blackmail and the like,” notwithstanding
“their expressive content”); United States v. Irving, 509 F.2d 1325, 1331 (5th Cir. 1975) (noting
that speech, in particular threats, is “properly punished every day under statutes prohibiting
extortion, blackmail and assault without consideration of First Amendment issues” (citing Watts
v. United States, 402 F.2d 676, 690 (D.C. Cir. 1968))); United States v. Varani, 435 F.2d 758, 762
(6th Cir. 1970) (“[S]peech is not protected . . . when it is the very vehicle of the crime itself.”
(citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 871–877 (1964))).
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overenforcement of the law or enforcement by the improper party.227
In cases where the information is simply embarrassing, Posner asserts
that blackmail is “the levying of a private tax on an activity that either
is unlikely to be discouraged by the tax or that society has no interest
in discouraging.”228 Epstein, while going so far as to acknowledge that
legalizing blackmail could potentially create economic benefit through
private enforcement of the criminal laws, warns that it would also
create “an open and public market for a new set of social institutions
to exploit the gains from this new form of legal activity.”229 These social
institutions, which Epstein calls “Blackmail, Inc.,” would then become
full-service firms that would also offer services to their own victims
instructing them on how to best conceal whatever shameful secrets
they may have from the other parties they affect.230 This, Epstein says,
would create an entire undesirable industry premised on fraud and
deceit.231
Moral arguments for punishing blackmail are perhaps a bit easier
to understand than consequentialist ones. Deontological theories
capture the moral instinct that something about the choice a
blackmailer forces on his victim constitutes an inherent wrong,
susceptible to criminal punishment under retributive theories of
justice. Professor Joel Feinberg claims that in cases in which either the
unconditional act of keeping incriminating information secret or the
unconditional act of revealing it is in and of itself a morally wrongful
harm to a third party, the criminal law can legitimately be invoked to
punish those who conditionally threaten or offer to commit either
act.232 He bases this argument on philosopher John Stuart Mill’s harm

227. See Richard A. Posner, Blackmail, Privacy and Freedom of Contract, 141 U. PA. L. REV.
1817, 1821–27 (1993) (arguing that blackmailers would contribute to overenforcement by acting
as “private law enforcers” but would also “undermine optimal law enforcement”).
228. Id. at 1834. A particularly colorful example of the second form of inefficiency involves
the potential blackmail of a victim who is sexually impotent and obtaining treatment from a sex
therapist. “What would be the consequences if such blackmail were permitted?” Posner asks, and
concludes “[n]ot less impotence, surely, but more. An impotent man would hesitate to seek
professional assistance for fear of increasing the probability that blackmailers would discover his
problem. The increase in impotence would generate (after subtracting the reduction in the use of
therapists’ services) a net social cost.” Id. at 1833.
229. Richard A. Epstein, Blackmail, Inc., 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 553, 562 (1983).
230. Id. at 564.
231. Id. at 565.
232. 4 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARMLESS
WRONGDOING 239 (1990).
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principle, which authorizes the law to restrict freedom only in cases
where such freedom results in harm to others.233 Feinberg’s project,
then, identifies which acts of revelation or concealment would in fact
constitute moral harms.234 So, for example, either offering to conceal a
crime or threatening to violate someone’s privacy by revealing
embarrassing, noncriminal information about them, might form the
basis for proper punishment consistent with the harm principle.235
By contrast, Professor George Fletcher argues that it is not the
disclosure or lack thereof itself that deontologically justifies punishing
blackmail, but the consequences of the threat to disclose.236 Fletcher
surveys ten disparate cases that would all constitute blackmail and
notes that the offense represents, by turns and depending on the
circumstances, “coercion of the victim, exploitation of the victim’s
weakness, . . . trading unfairly in assets or chips that belong to others,”
and “an undesirable and abusive form of private law enforcement.”237
Further, the offense “leads to the waste of resources so far as
blackmailers are induced to collect information that they are willing to
suppress for a fee.”238 Yet he concludes that the one core wrong of
blackmail, which can be identified across all potential cases, relates to
the fact that blackmail is not a “one-shot affair.”239 Because a
blackmailer can continue to subject his victim to repeated requests for
more and more money—in the absence of an appropriate legal
mechanism by which the victim can hold the blackmailer to his original
bargain—blackmail creates an ongoing state of domination and
subordination between the blackmailer and his victim.240 Fletcher
argues that, because the criminal law is supposed to prevent precisely
this relationship arising between private parties, not only is blackmail
not anomalous but it is, in fact, a “paradigm” for understanding
wrongdoing and criminal punishment generally.241

233.
(1859).
234.
235.
236.
(1993).
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 21–22 (John Gray ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2008)
Feinberg, supra note 232, at 239–58.
Id.
George P. Fletcher, Blackmail: The Paradigmatic Crime, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1617, 1620
Id. at 1637 (citations omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1638.
Id. at 1617.
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More recently, Professor Mitchell Berman has provided an
“evidentiary” theory of blackmail, focusing on what the blackmailer’s
overt act tells a fact-finder about his motivations.242 Berman argues that
blackmail should be understood as a subset of extortion, rather than as
a unique crime.243 Extortion, he asserts, may be criminally wrongful
either due to the actus reus (in cases where what the extortionist
threatens is in and of itself a crime) or due to the extortionist’s
culpability (in cases where he has the purpose to, or certain knowledge
that, his conduct will harm his victim).244 Berman concludes that
blackmail falls into this second category, and that the action of
threatening to reveal embarrassing information—even if legal in and
of itself—may be evidence of the blackmailer’s intent to do harm and
thus justify criminal liability.245 In an empirical study on lay intuitions
about blackmail, Professors Paul H. Robinson, Michael T. Cahill, and
Daniel M. Bartels attempt to determine what the general public feels
are the appropriate justifications for criminalizing the offense.246 They
find support for Berman’s theory, concluding that “lay understandings
of blackmail share the position that its gravamen involves harm to the
recipient of the threat, rather than some third party or generalized
social interest.”247 They also find that lay institutions do not attach any
significance to the magnitude of a blackmailer’s demand or to the
nature of the information the blackmailer threatens to disclose.248
These deontological theories provide a potential justification for
the criminalization of coercive control. Almost every moral
justification for punishing the blackmailer would appear to apply
similarly to the person who deliberately coerces his intimate partner
over a sustained period of time in a manner that causes the victim
significant harm, even if the coercive conduct is, like the blackmailer’s
threatened revelation, based upon speech. Is it a morally wrongful

242. Mitchell N. Berman, The Evidentiary Theory of Blackmail: Taking Motives Seriously, 65
U. CHI. L. REV. 795, 797–98 (1998); Mitchell N. Berman, Meta-Blackmail and the Evidentiary
Theory: Still Taking Motives Seriously, 94 GEO. L.J. 787, 789 (2006) [hereinafter Berman, MetaBlackmail].
243. See Berman, Meta-Blackmail, supra note 242, at 789–98.
244. Id. at 790.
245. Id.
246. See generally Robinson et al., supra note 218 (analyzing how competing theories align
with the prevailing sentiment of blackmail).
247. Id. at 347.
248. Id. at 348.
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harm, as Feinberg asks of blackmail, to restrict a domestic partner’s
liberty in the same way that it is to violate someone’s privacy? If one
looks at the harms of coercive control discussed in Part I, the answer
would seem to be yes. At a minimum, it is no less vague to say that
coercive control does a moral harm to the victim’s liberty interest than
it is to say that blackmail does a moral harm to the victim’s privacy
interest. Does coercive control create an ongoing state of “domina[nce]
and subordination” analogous to the one Fletcher argues is the product
of blackmail and, indeed, the paradigmatic purview of the criminal
law?249 Almost by definition, yes—the very sociological meaning of
domestic violence is “a pattern of behaviors used by one partner to
maintain power and control over another partner in an intimate
relationship,” which highlights the relationship between the habits of
physical and nonphysical abuse and the purpose of creating sustained
domination.250
But does coercive control reflect the same culpability to the
victim’s harm that Berman identifies as integral to all cases of
blackmail? Here is one theory of blackmail by which the U.K.
definition of coercive control may be too broad to be justified. Recall
that in the U.K. offense the defendant’s mere negligence as to the
“serious effect” his conduct has on his victim is enough to trigger
liability; he is guilty if he “ought to know” of such an effect.251 If we
accept Berman’s justification for blackmail—as Robinson and others
suggest the general public may252—it reveals one area in which coercive
control could profitably be narrowed to track with existing norms
about criminally coercive speech.
This quibble aside, it seems that blackmail—which, while
conceptually “paradoxical,” is politically accepted and remains on the
books in all fifty states—may guide an attempt to punish the similar
offense of coercive control. The perpetrators of the two offenses
possess similar intent—to extract something from their victims via
coercive behavior that, while morally wrong, may not, in and of itself,
be unlawful. Where the two offenses part ways is in the actus reus
elements. Blackmail requires a particular quid pro quo—the
perpetrator must threaten a particular revelation in exchange for a

249. Fletcher, supra note 236, at 1626–29.
250. What Is Domestic Violence?, NAT’L DOMESTIC VIOLENCE HOTLINE (May 14, 2017),
https://www.thehotline.org/is-this-abuse/abuse-defined [https://perma.cc/W5CN-HTFW].
251. Serious Crime Act 2015, c. 9, § 76 (UK).
252. See Robinson et al., supra note 218, at 347.
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particular concession from the victim. If one agrees with Fletcher’s
“subordination” view of blackmail, one could argue that the true
criminal harm of blackmail lies not in that particular quid pro quo but
in the ongoing enterprise of coercion that arises from the initial
transaction. Nonetheless, it is clear that the nature of the conduct
prohibited by blackmail statutes is far more precisely defined than the
open-ended language of the U.K. coercive control statute. But this
would seem to be a vagueness problem that could be resolved through
more precise drafting, not a First Amendment ground for
distinguishing between the two doctrines. Blackmail punishes purely
and inherently communicative conduct—namely, the threat to make a
revelation.
Despite blackmail’s attractiveness as an analog for a legislature
trying to fashion a coercive control offense that could survive
constitutional challenges, the need to draft a sufficiently narrow actus
reus would not be the only problem drafters would face. At least some
courts have cited the historical pedigree of blackmail as a distinct crime
at common law as a basis for approving its punishment of otherwise
legal speech. For example, the Sixth Circuit, in asserting that “[w]ords
often are the sole means of committing crime—think bribery, perjury,
blackmail, fraud” and that “the First Amendment does not disable
governments from punishing these language-based crimes” noted that
many of these crimes “pre-dated the First Amendment.”253 The
Oregon Supreme Court, in the process of holding the state’s thenexisting coercion statute unconstitutional on First Amendment
grounds, despite the fact that it criminalized illegal threats, noted that
“[j]udicial and academic analyses of the principles governing freedom
to make demands coupled with threats have been sparse and
inconclusive.”254 However, the court took care to distinguish the
seemingly more problematic crime of blackmail, stating it had “no
doubt” that blackmail statutes would survive free speech challenges on
“historic grounds alone.”255 Needless to say, a coercive control offense
would not likely enjoy such historically justified constitutional
exceptionalism.

253. United States v. Jeffries, 692 F.3d 473, 478 (6th Cir. 2012).
254. State v. Robertson, 649 P.2d 569, 580 (Or. 1982). The redrafted version of the
statute passed constitutional muster provided that the “fear” felt by the victim is objectively
reasonable, the physical injury that is feared is objectively reasonable, and the “some person” to
whom injury is threatened is a specific person. State v. Stone, 735 P.2d 7, 9 (Or. Ct. App.).
255. Robertson, 649 P.2d at 581.
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E. Criminal Conspiracy
It may seem counterintuitive to seek doctrinal insights about an
offense as intimate as coercive control from the jurisprudence on group
liability. At first blush, the two fields might be thought to occupy
theoretically polar ends of criminal liability. But the law of criminal
conspiracy poses structural challenges surprisingly similar to those of
coercive control. As scholar Albert Harno once observed:
In the long category of crimes there is none . . . more difficult to
confine within the boundaries of definitive statement than conspiracy.
It covers the field of crimes and makes unlawful agreements among
individuals to commit any crime; it extends to agreements to commit
at least some torts and some breaches of contract, and, finally, it
shades into the horizon with agreements to do acts, which, though not
unlawful when done by the parties separately, may, nevertheless,
become unlawful ends for those who agree to commit them.256

The crime of conspiracy at common law resembles coercive control
insofar as it may capture otherwise noncriminal conduct due primarily
to the harms posed by the situational and sociological structure in
which the conduct occurs.
The common law rule that it can be criminal merely to agree to
commit an unlawful act, even with no evidence of an attempt to execute
it, dates all the way back to the 1611 Poulterers’ Case,257 decided by the
Star Chamber and eventually followed by common law courts after the
Restoration.258 As Justice John Willes put it in the nineteenth century,
“[s]o long as such a design rests in intention only, it is not indictable”
but “[w]hen two agree to carry it into effect, the very plot is an act in
itself, and the act of each of the parties . . . punishable if for a criminal
object or for the use of criminal means.”259 Just as a lawful agreement
between two parties would be enforceable against them, an unlawful
agreement may serve as the basis for criminal sanction.
The justifications for criminalizing conspiracy as a distinct,
inchoate crime are familiar and somewhat controversial. The lesser
rationale is one of expedience. Conspiracy has been said to “fill the gap

256. Albert J. Harno, Intent in Criminal Conspiracy, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 624, 624 (1940–41)
(citations omitted).
257. The Poulterers’ Case, (1611) 77 Eng. Rep. 813 (KB).
258. Harno, supra note 256, at 628.
259. Mulcahy v. The Queen, L. R. 3 Eng. & Ir. App. 306, 317 (1868) (emphasis added).
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created by a law of attempt too narrowly conceived”; it allows law
enforcement to arrest perpetrators before they have proceeded so far
in their plans as to have taken that dangerous “substantial step” toward
commission of the offense itself.260 The greater rationale “lies in the
fact—or at least the assumption—that collective action toward an
antisocial end involves a greater risk to society than individual action
toward the same end.”261 As the Supreme Court has articulated it,
“[c]oncerted action both increases the likelihood that the criminal
object will be successfully attained and decreases the probability that
the individuals involved will depart from their path of criminality.”262
In other words, sharing a criminal intent with at least one other party
increases the odds of it being executed to an extent that agreement
alone—even without a substantial step toward its completion263—
suffices as an actus reus to support a criminal conviction.
Some psychological literature appears to support this second
justification. As Professor Neal Katyal summarizes it, “it is generally
accepted that groups are more likely to polarize toward extremes, to
take courses of action that advance the interests of the group even in
the face of personal doubts, and to act with greater loyalty to each
other.”264 Other scholars disagree on the merits as to the alleged
dangerousness of groups. As Professor Abraham Goldstein argues,
including multiple participants in a criminal scheme could in fact
increase the risk that someone will leak the plan or result in the
participants sharing uncertainties and dissuading one another from
proceeding.265
Despite such objections, these two rationales for criminal
conspiracy have carried the day to date. The law assumes both that
conspiracy is a necessary tool for overcoming evidentiary obstacles to
targeting certain forms of individual harm and that group intent poses
260. See Peter Buscemi, Note, Conspiracy: Statutory Reform Since the Model Penal Code, 75
COLUM. L. REV. 1122, 1122 n.5, 1154 (1975).
261. Developments in the Law—Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARV. L. REV. 920, 923–24 (1959).
262. Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 593 (1961).
263. The Model Penal Code changes the common law rule and makes an “overt act” an
element of conspiracy. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03(5) (AM. L. INST. 1985). States have followed
the code to varying degrees, some requiring a substantial step in furtherance of the conspiracy,
while others adhering to the common law rule and rejecting such a requirement. See Matthew
Ladew, Speaking Louder than Words: Finding an Overt Act Requirement in the Hobbs Act, 28
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 67, 72 (2018).
264. Neal Kumar Katyal, Conspiracy Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1307, 1316 (2003).
265. Abraham S. Goldstein, Conspiracy To Defraud the United States, 68 YALE L.J. 405, 414
(1959).
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a unique danger requiring a unique remedy in the substantive criminal
law. Although, of course, the offense of conspiracy requires intent to
commit a crime, mere intent to commit a crime is not itself a crime.
Conspiracy criminalizes communicated intent, even without the clear
and present danger generally required to meet the true threats
exception to the First Amendment. The twin justifications for this
seeming anomaly track surprisingly closely with the justifications for
the coercive control offense urged by its U.K. proponents. Remember
the two harms coercive control causes: the direct physical and
psychological harms and the future violent harms predicted by coercive
control. Conspiracy has survived for four centuries despite its tensions
with traditional principles of criminality on very similar reasoning.
First, it is easier to redress the direct harms of crime if an event—
in this case, the conspiratorial agreement—can be criminalized that
occurs chronologically earlier than the “overt act” of which the crime
of attempt requires evidence. This claim is analogous to the assertion
that an offense is needed that can more easily capture the complex
interrelation between all forms of control—physical and mental—
rather than the “transactional” episodes of physical violence that form
the primary basis for prosecution under existing law. Conspiracy does
what coercive control seeks to do: removes evidentiary obstacles to
targeting a well-known set of harms that are hard to prove on an
individual basis.
Second, both conspiracy and coercive control seek to punish a
heightened risk of danger, premised on context. Judicial intuition and
empirical literature alike suggest that groups are dangerous—that what
might remain merely a nasty thought if held by a single actor is more
likely to manifest in the real world once it becomes the basis of an
agreement with another party. Similarly, individual acts of controlling
conduct toward a domestic relation become dangerous when they form
a part of a broader coercive pattern. Sociology reveals the violence
predicted by coercive control patterns, which in turn, provides the
justification for turning something that would otherwise be a perfectly
lawful incident of discord within a marriage into a crime.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the fundamental similarities in
justification, conspiracy law’s punishment of mere agreement creates
several problems of legality, which quite closely parallel those
previously discussed as potentially plaguing a coercive control offense.
The Supreme Court has set very loose requirements for what due
process requires the prosecution to show in order to prove the actus
reus element of “agreement.” The Court has stated that “the
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agreement need not be shown to have been explicit. It can instead be
inferred from the facts and circumstances of the case.”266 Courts have
construed this to mean that a “mere tacit understanding will suffice,
and there need not be any written statement or even a speaking of
words which expressly communicates agreement.”267
Professor Laurent Sacharoff has pointed out the vagueness
problems inherent in this formulation.268 As Sacharoff notes,
“agreement” can mean something as legally specific as a contract—
with an exchange of promises and obligation of performance—or it can
refer to merely shared opinion—“as when we say, ‘experts agree
smoking causes cancer.’”269 He asserts that the familiar principle that
the agreement is the actus reus has devolved in practice into an
effective trial rule where a person becomes guilty of conspiracy merely
“for proximity to criminal activity.”270 He proposes that, to prove the
agreement element of conspiracy, a prosecutor should have to prove
an exchange of promises to commit a crime, which he suggests would
create an obligation among the parties to follow through with the
crime.271
Furthermore, the criminalization of mere agreement poses,
similarly to a coercive control offense, potential First Amendment
issues. Professor Martin Redish and then-law student Michael Downey
argue that, to the extent that parties form agreements through speech
unaccompanied by overt acts, they may be eligible for constitutional
protection.272 They note that under the controlling clear-and-presentdanger test established in Brandenburg v. Ohio,273 speech openly
advocating criminal conduct may be constitutionally suppressed only
when “such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.”274 They
argue that no principled distinction between criminal incitement and
criminal conspiracy exists and that, therefore, the First Amendment

266. Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 777 n.10 (1975).
267. See, e.g., State v. Mapp, 585 N.W.2d 746, 748 (Iowa 1998).
268. Laurent Sacharoff, Conspiracy as Contract, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 405, 407–08 (2016).
269. Id. at 408.
270. Id. at 410.
271. Id. at 410–11.
272. Martin H. Redish & Michael J.T. Downey, Criminal Conspiracy as Free Expression, 76
ALB. L. REV. 697, 699 (2012).
273. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
274. Redish & Downey, supra note 272, at 730 (citing Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447–48).
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requires “proof of overt, non-expressive acts intertwined with the
expression involved in [forming a] conspiracy.”275
The coercive control offense shares yet another important
structural feature with the crime of conspiracy. Beyond its substitution
of mere agreement for actus reus, common law conspiracy is, as Harno
notes, also unusual in the sorts of agreements it criminalizes. The
common law defined conspiracy as an agreement “either to do an
unlawful act, or a lawful act by unlawful means.”276 Early
commentators argued over the meaning of “unlawful” in this context,
including nineteenth-century treatise writer James Fitzjames Stephen.
Stephen notes how, in some cases, “an agreement to do an unlawful act
was held to mean something more than an agreement to do an act
which is in itself criminal when done by a single person” because the
courts used the word “unlawful” “in a sense closely approaching to
immoral simply, and amounting at least to immoral and at the same
time injurious to the public.”277 English courts at this time therefore
criminalized conspiracies to commit “immoral” acts, such as falsely
accusing a person of fathering a bastard, indenturing a girl at
prostitution, marrying off a pauper so as to charge another parish with
his support, raising workmen’s wages, committing civil trespass, and
combining to “defraud” the government through otherwise
noncriminal means.278
The modern American definition of conspiracy is, depending on
jurisdiction, the creature of either statute or common law and therefore
widely variable. Most states now require that the object of a conspiracy
be itself a crime.279 Yet Stephen’s understanding of “unlawful” as far
broader than “criminal” remains on the books in some states today.
Courts in those state may construe “unlawful means” to include
conspiracies to commit noncriminal acts that are nonetheless injurious
to the public health or morals or to trade or commerce, or that may

275. Id. at 732.
276. See, e.g., R v. Jones (1832) 110 Eng. Rep. 485, 487 (KB).
277. 2 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 229
(London, MacMillan & Co. 1883).
278. 2 WAYNE LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW 393–94 (3d ed. 2018) (citations
omitted).
279. Id. at 395.
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result in the perversion or obstruction of justice or the due
administration of the laws.280
For example, in State v. Blackledge,281 the Supreme Court of Iowa
upheld the criminal conviction of the defendants—officers in a
workmen’s organization—for conspiracy to injure the property and
funds of that organization by loaning its funds out for a fee in violation
of a civil provision of the Iowa Code.282 On appeal, one of the
defendants objected that the indictment below was insufficient because
it had failed to allege that he had committed any acts that were
themselves felonious.283 Though acknowledging a conflict in Iowa case
law on this subject, the court cited its own prior conspiracy decisions
that, “in referring to the [unlawful means requirement], have used the
words ‘illegal’ and ‘unlawful’ interchangeably and obviously without
intending thereby to imply a crime.”284 It therefore held that the
defendants’ conviction for criminal conspiracy was proper because
“[t]he means charged in the indictment . . . were unlawful and illegal”
and “[a]lthough not criminal, the intent of the defendants named was
to unlawfully obtain from the society named funds belonging thereto
and to its certificate and policy holders.”285
Some state criminal codes contain conspiracy provisions explicitly
worded to include noncriminal conduct, such as the California Penal
Code which states: “[t]wo or more persons [may not] conspire . . . [t]o
commit any act injurious to the public health, to public morals, or to
pervert or obstruct justice, or the due administration of the laws.”286

280. See, e.g., State v. Parker, 158 A. 797, 799 (Conn. 1932) (“A conspiracy will be indictable,
if the end proposed or the means to be employed are, by reason of the combination, particularly
dangerous to the public interests, or particularly injurious to some individual, although not
criminal.” (citations omitted)); Commonwealth v. Donoghue, 63 S.W.2d 3, 6 (Ky. 1933) (noting
that an agreement may be indicted under the common law of criminal conspiracy if its objectives
“have a tendency to injure the public, to violate public policy, or to injure, oppress, or wrongfully
prejudice individuals collectively or the public generally” (citations omitted)); State v. Burnham,
15 N.H. 396, 403 (1844) (“When it is said . . . that the means must be unlawful, it is not to be
understood that those means must amount to indictable offenses, in order to make the offence of
conspiracy complete. It will be enough if they are corrupt, dishonest, fraudulent, immoral, and in
that sense illegal.” (citation omitted)). But see People v. Redd, 228 Cal. App. 4th 449, 463–64 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2014).
281. State v. Blackledge, 243 N.W. 534 (Iowa 1932).
282. Id. at 535.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 535, 537.
285. Id.
286. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 182(a)(5) (West 2011).
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Furthermore, some states also retain fraud statutes that base criminal
liability on the “unlawful means” of defrauding—the conspiratorial
element—without defining the fraud itself as a crime in its own right if
committed by an individual.287
That said, this approach has been heavily criticized. In considering
a 1948 appeal of conviction under a Utah statute criminalizing
“conspiracy to commit acts injurious to public morals” the Supreme
Court deferred to the statutory interpretation of the Utah Supreme
Court, but warned that such provisions may run afoul of the vagueness
and overbreadth prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment:
It is obvious that this is no narrowly drawn statute. We do not
presume to give an interpretation as to what it may include. Standing
by itself, it would seem to be warrant for conviction for agreement to
do almost any act which a judge and jury might find at the moment
contrary to his or its notions of what was good for health, morals,
trade, commerce, justice or order. In some States the phrase
“injurious to public morals” would be likely to punish acts which it
would not punish in others because of the varying policies on such
matters as use of cigarettes or liquor and the permissibility of
gambling.288

In his seminal treatise on substantive criminal law, Professor
Wayne LaFave notes the extent to which state courts have ignored this
warning and continued to uphold such conspiracy statutes289 but urges,
nonetheless, that the statutes fail to provide sufficient notice of what
conduct is criminal.290 He argues that if broad conspiracy provisions
287. See, e.g., id. § 182(a)(4) (making it an offense to “defraud any person,” but by “means . . .
themselves criminal”); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-1-1(1)(d) (West 2020) (making it an offense “to
defraud another out of property by any means which are in themselves criminal” or “would
amount to a cheat”); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 421 (West 2020) (same). Some states use the
same approach to criminalizing conspiracy to defraud the government. See, e.g., IOWA CODE
ANN. § 425.13 (West 2020) (criminalizing fraud in obtaining homestead tax credits); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 752.1005 (West 2020) (criminalizing fraud in obtaining health care benefits); MISS.
CODE ANN. § 43-13-211 (fraud regarding Medicaid benefits), id. § 97-7-15 (criminalizing fraud in
other specified ways); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 424; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-3-8 (2020)
(criminalizing defrauding the state for any purpose); UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-20-6 (West 2020)
(criminalizing a false claim for medical benefits); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-10-31 (West 2020)
(criminalizing defrauding the state for any purpose).
288. Musser v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95, 96–97 (1948).
289. See, e.g., Calhoun v. Sup. Ct., 291 P.2d 474, 482 (Cal. 1955); Lorenson v. Sup. Ct., 216
P.2d 859, 866 (Cal. 1950); People v. Sullivan, 248 P.2d 520, 528 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952); State v.
Nielsen, 426 P.2d 13, 16 (Utah 1967).
290. LAFAVE, supra note 278, at 395 (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03 (AM. L. INST. 1985)).
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make it easier to reach, through group liability, harmful conduct for
which it is difficult to penalize individuals, then the solution is to reform
the substantive criminal law in those areas.291 Alternatively, he argues
that if some activities should indeed only be criminal if engaged in by
groups then special conspiracy provisions must be no less precise than
any other penal provisions.292
To summarize, the offense of conspiracy emerged from a similar
set of theoretical motivations as the offense of coercive control and has
created a similar range of theoretical problems. Both may provide
useful insights should state legislatures seek to follow the United
Kingdom’s lead and recognize coercive control as a criminal offense.
Remember that under the U.K. statute, to be guilty of coercive control
a defendant must repeatedly or continuously engage in behavior that is
controlling or coercive, that behavior must have a serious effect on the
victim, and the defendant either must know in fact or ought to know of
this serious effect. The actus reus requirement of “repeated and
continuous” behavior functions doctrinally similarly to the longaccepted actus reus of “agreement” in conspiracy law: it transforms
thought that would be purely private into a public danger appropriate
for criminalization.
The scholarly criticisms of conspiracy’s legality problems may also
inform any legislative attempt to refine the U.K. statute into an offense
that could pass constitutional scrutiny in the United States. In the first
place, the word “behavior” suffers from many of the same vagueness
and First Amendment problems as “agreement.” To avoid First
Amendment issues, legislatures could substitute for “behavior” a list
of conduct including “actions” and other forms of constitutionally
unprotected speech: certainly “threats” of violence, but also false and
fraudulent speech and coercive speech of the sort typically punished by
blackmail statutes. To avoid vagueness problems legislatures could
adopt a mens rea requirement that the behavioral actus reus be
accompanied by a specific intent to assert long-term, nontrivial control
over the victim’s liberty.
Such revisions would still mean that the offense of coercive control
covered conduct that was not in and of itself criminal. In that respect it
would remain open to the sorts of objections levied at the “unlawful
means” theory of criminal conspiracy. Unless, of course, the nature of

291. Id.
292. Id.
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the actus reus of coercive control is reconceptualized, which will be the
task of the next subsection.
F. Fraud
“Force” and “fraud” are frequently recognized as the two
traditional bases for criminal liability.293 Deontological theories of
criminal punishment explain why: physical coercion and dishonesty are
widely perceived to be immoral violations of the rights of others.294
Even economic theory supports the criminalization of these two
categories of conduct because “[f]orce and artifice are inherently
coercive behaviors, unresponsive to the market mechanisms that put
exchange prices on what people want to achieve.”295 In the economic
view, fraud is wrong because it allows the perpetrator to gain an offmarket advantage that the market itself cannot punish.296 Most of the
crimes discussed so far as in some way similar to coercive control create
the possibility of force (stalking, conspiracy, depending on the
predicate offense) or at least coercion (blackmail). Yet criminal fraud
jurisprudence is relevant as well. Like coercive control, fraud is
famously difficult to define precisely, often requiring an exercise of
purely moral intuition to identify.297 It therefore presents similar
problems as coercive control for legislators trying to decide exactly

293. Epstein, supra note 229, at 556.
294. Epstein notes that:
The moral stand against force and fraud provides a powerful theory to generate the
standard set of criminal offenses: larceny, taking by false pretenses, and embezzlement
all presuppose that we have (and we do have) a clear sense of who owns what before
the transaction in question takes place; with that settled, given transactions are
characterized as criminal not by some haphazard formula, but because they conform to
the implicit pattern of entitlements and their violations outlined above.
Id. at 556–57. Jayme Herschkopf similarly notes that:
Fraud, at its core, is a type of deception, and it is that deception that encapsulates
fraud’s immorality. To deceive is to infringe on another’s autonomy: to willfully alter
another’s mental processes by skewing the truth. Whether the deception leads to
material harm is irrelevant from a deontological point of view; the deception itself is
the wrong committed.
Jayme Herschkopf, Morality and Securities Fraud, 101 MARQ. L. REV. 453, 465 (2017) (citations
omitted).
295. Alex Stein, Corrupt Intentions: Bribery, Unlawful Gratuity, and Honest Services Fraud,
75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 61, 61 (2012).
296. Id.
297. See, e.g., Weiss v. United States, 122 F.2d 675, 681 (5th Cir. 1941) (“[T]he law does not
define fraud; it needs no definition; it is as old as falsehood and as versable as human ingenuity.”).
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where unethical dealings between two private actors should cross the
line into criminality.
Fraud is commonly defined as the intentional misrepresentation
of a material existing fact made by one person to another with
knowledge of its falsity and for the purpose of inducing the other
person to act, and upon which the other person relies with resulting
injury or damage.298 That said, the precise content and existence of each
of these elements varies substantially by jurisdiction, by substantive
legal context, and according to jurisprudential gloss.299 At common law,
fraud between private parties was traditionally a civil concept, leaving
only frauds against the public to be punished criminally.300 Even civil
law once primarily left transacting parties to their own devices until the
increasing complexity of the commercial age saw a demand for legal
intervention to protect vulnerable consumers from the ever-more
creative predations of their corporate counterparties.301 In our current
era, a wide range of state and, in particular, federal laws impose not
only civil but criminal liability for various forms of fraud.302 Laws like
the federal mail303 and wire fraud304 statutes may speak generally to
fraud across a wide range of circumstances; others may focus on
particular contexts such as securities fraud,305 health care fraud,306 or
banking fraud.307
Though the traditional understanding of fraud involves elements
of both intentional deceit and resulting harm to the victim, its “moral
dimension”—the justification for moving it into the criminal law as
opposed to the purely compensatory realm of tort law—comes from its
mental component, scienter.308 Scienter—defined as the “fraudulent
intent” or “intent to deceive”—is not always a requirement in civil

298. See 1 EDWARD J. DEVITT, CHARLES B. BLACKMAR, MICHAEL A. WOLFF & KEVIN F.
O’MALLEY, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS 583 (4th ed. 1992) (defining “fraud”
and “fraudulent”).
299. Ellen S. Podgor, Criminal Fraud, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 729, 738–39 (1999).
300. Id. at 736.
301. Herschkopf, supra note 294, at 465.
302. Podgor, supra note 299, at 737.
303. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2018).
304. Id. § 1343.
305. Id. § 1348.
306. Id. § 1347.
307. Id. § 1344.
308. Herschkopf, supra note 294, at 458.
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fraud cases but typically is in criminal actions.309 For example, the
government must be able to show at least “willfulness” to convert a
civil violation of the securities laws into a criminal one.310 As the
Supreme Court put it recently in a case about bankruptcy fraud:
“Actual fraud” has two parts: actual and fraud. The word “actual” has
a simple meaning in the context of common-law fraud: It denotes any
fraud that “involv[es] moral turpitude or intentional wrong.”
“Actual” fraud stands in contrast to “implied” fraud or fraud “in law,”
which describe acts of deception that “may exist without the
imputation of bad faith or immorality.” Thus, anything that counts as
“fraud” and is done with wrongful intent is “actual fraud.”311

In other words, under the common law understanding the actor’s intent
in performing an act of deception has a separate legal existence and
effect above and beyond the act of deception itself.
Taking this basic structure of fraud law as a guide, we can make
some general observations about an attempt to criminalize coercive
control. First off, the criminal law may properly address itself to the
harm imposed on one party by another in a superior power relation.
As Professor Alex Stein notes, the essence of fraud is coercion;312 if
coercion through deceit requires intervention by the state at some
point it stands to reason that other forms of nonphysical, nonpecuniary
coercion may as well. Second, all forms of coercive dealings—
fraudulent or otherwise—may vary in severity and therefore create
shades of gray for lawmakers trying to determine where criminal
liability should attach. Just as the criminal law does not punish all acts
of deception as criminal fraud in the absence of scienter, it may not be
appropriate for criminal coercive control to include, as the U.K. statute
does, inadvertent conduct even if unreasonable.
On the flip side, criminal fraud itself presents a host of conceptual
and enforcement problems that also find analogs in the coercive
control context. In particular, the expansive theories of fraud justifying

309. Id. at 458, 472.
310. See Securities Act of 1933 § 24, 15 U.S.C. § 77x (2018) (requiring a person to “willfully”
violate); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 32(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (same); Investment
Company Act of 1940 § 49, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-48 (same); Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 217, 15
U.S.C. § 80b-17 (same).
311. Husky Int’l Elecs., Inc. v. Ritz, 136 S. Ct. 1581, 1586 (2016) (alteration in original)
(quoting Neal v. Clark, 95 U.S. 704, 709 (1878)).
312. Stein, supra note 295, at 61.
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most prosecutions under the federal mail and wire fraud statutes draw
a great deal of critical fire for allowing too much room for prosecutorial
abuse and excessive discretion.313 In the 1940s, courts began to
interpret the potential object of a criminal “scheme or artifice to
defraud” under those statutes to include not only money or property
but the “intangible rights” to such goods as intellectual property314 and
the honest services of government employees, free from the influence
of unlawful gratuities.315 Eventually, the Supreme Court rejected the
theory of “honest services” fraud,316 but Congress restored it with 18
U.S.C. § 1346, which clarifies that “[f]or the purposes of this chapter,
the term ‘scheme or artifice to defraud’ includes a scheme or artifice to
deprive another of the intangible right of honest services.”317
This statutory fix, however, left unresolved a number of
conceptual problems that have troubled courts, litigants, and
commentators in the years since. First off, it appears that the
“intangible right of honest services” includes the right to receive honest
services from private actors, and not merely public employees.318 This
raises the question of whether, to form the basis for a private-sector
honest services fraud action, the deprivation of honest services must
involve the violation of a fiduciary duty. In United States v.
Milovanovic,319 the Ninth Circuit held that a breach of fiduciary duty is
indeed a required element of private-sector honest services fraud, but
that such a duty is not “limited to a formal ‘fiduciary’ relationship wellknown in the law” and may include relationships in which “one party
acts for the benefit of another and induces the trusting party to relax
the care and vigilance which it would ordinarily exercise.”320 The rule
that certain relationships give rise to obligations of fair dealing,
particularly where the nature of the relationship induces trust on the
313. The statutes’ perceived expansiveness and potential for abuse has given rise to the
facetious expression, “when in doubt, charge mail fraud.” John C. Coffee, Jr., From Tort to Crime:
Some Reflections on the Criminalization of Fiduciary Breaches and the Problematic Line Between
Law and Ethics, 19 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 117, 126 (1981).
314. Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 25 (1987).
315. Shusan v. United States, 117 F.2d 110, 115 (5th Cir. 1941).
316. McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 358 (1987).
317. 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2018).
318. See, e.g., United States v. Frost, 125 F.3d 346, 367–68 (6th Cir. 1997) (affirming the honest
services fraud conviction of university professors for allowing students to plagiarize work and
receive degrees on that basis).
319. United States v. Milovanovic, 678 F.3d 713 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
320. Id. at 724.
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part of the victim, is similar to the idea that intimate relationships
create other sorts of trust, the exploitation of which could be in the
purview of criminal law. Nonetheless, legislators drafting a coercive
control offense should avoid the ambiguity caused by Congress’s
decision in § 1346 not to be clear about the particular private-sector
relationships that might trigger a right to “honest services.”
One question the Supreme Court has answered as to the scope of
honest services fraud is the nature of the “scheme to defraud”
necessary for liability to attach. As discussed earlier in this Article,
Skilling v. United States321 held that mere “self-dealing” by private
actors—such as former Enron CEO Jeff Skilling, whose securities
fraud was motivated in part by his interest in receiving gigantic
bonuses—was insufficient to support an honest services fraud
conviction.322 In considering Skilling’s vagueness challenge the Court
explicitly limited private-sector honest services fraud to cases
specifically involving bribery or kickbacks, which it described as
forming the “core of the pre-McNally case law.”323 Congress, of course,
would have been free to define the range of contemplated schemes to
defraud however it chose. But Skilling shows how a generally worded
prohibition on a “scheme to coerce” would likely fail vagueness
scrutiny. At least in the context of fraud, background common law
indicates that certain types of conduct—bribery and kickbacks—fell
squarely into the category of honest services fraud Congress sought to
codify at § 1346. In the absence of such pre-statutory case law on
coercive control, it seems unlikely that a similarly worded coercive
control statute would survive even in part on the logic of Skilling.
Another illuminating open question in private-sector honest
services fraud jurisprudence is whether the government must prove
that the victim faced any risk of economic harm or that such harm was
foreseeable to the defendant. Circuits are currently split. The majority
rule, followed by the First, Fourth, Sixth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits,
is that a breach of fiduciary duty must cause a risk of reasonably
foreseeable harm.324 The Second, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits, however,
321. Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358 (2010).
322. Id. at 368.
323. Id. at 409.
324. See, e.g., United States v. Vinyard, 266 F.3d 320, 328 (4th Cir. 2001); United States v.
Martin, 228 F.3d 1, 17 (lst Cir. 2000); United States v. Devetger, 198 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir.
1999); United States v. Frost, 125 F.3d 346, 368 (6th Cir. 1997); United States v. Lemire, 720 F.2d
1327, 1337 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
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follow the so-called “materiality standard,” which requires only that
the government prove the deceitful employee “has reason to believe
the information [hidden] would lead a reasonable employer to change
its business conduct.”325 To avoid a near-identical problem of
construction, a coercive control offense would need to be clear about
whether the government would be required to prove an objective risk
of harm to the victim, or whether it would be enough to show that the
perpetrator had reason to believe his conduct was likely to change his
victim’s conduct in some way. Either way, to the extent that honest
services fraud requires, at most, only a risk of injury to the victim, it is
a better model for coercive control than the emotional injury-based
theories of child and elder abuse discussed in Part III.A, with their
bedeviling problems of proof. For the same reasons it is an
improvement on the “serious effect” element of the U.K. coercive
control statute.
Beyond the particular doctrinal puzzles of honest services fraud, a
look at how courts generally apply fraud offenses in practice provides
a final set of insights into how a coercive control offense might play
out. As Professor Samuel Buell notes, the difficulty in defining fraud
lies precisely in determining the optimal level of specificity as to
prohibited conduct.326 Defined too broadly, the offense may fail to
adequately clarify what behavior is actually criminal.327 Defined too
narrowly, however, the law may fail to anticipate and keep up with the
endless creativity of commercial actors who excel at devising new ways
to achieve arguably fraudulent results while narrowly remaining on the
right side of existing law.328 The preceding sections have demonstrated
how any attempt to draft a coercive control offense presents a similar
Scylla and Charybdis.
To resolve this problem in fraud cases, Buell observes, courts and
enforcement actors appear to apply a post hoc methodology for
determining whether to punish an actor pursuing truly “novel”
deceptive conduct that does not clearly violate existing fraud
prohibitions.329 He asserts that such actors get convicted when the
325. United States v. Ballard, 663 F.2d 534, 541 (5th Cir. 1981); accord United States v. Brown,
459 F.3d 509, 519 (5th Cir. 2006); United States v. Rybicki, 354 F.3d 124, 145 (2d Cir. 2003) (en
banc); United States v. Cochran, 109 F.3d 660, 667 (10th Cir. 1997).
326. Samuel W. Buell, Novel Criminal Fraud, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1971, 1973–74, 1980 (2006).
327. Id. at 1981.
328. Id. at 1973–74.
329. Id. at 1971.
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government can present evidence of “consciousness of wrongdoing”—
for example, “badges of guilt” such as concealment—accompanying
their behavior.330 Buell concludes that this post hoc sorting avoids some
of the problems inherent in devising more precise conduct rules and
can be justified on the basis that an actor who pursues deceptive
behavior “in the face of actual knowledge that prevailing norms reject
that behavior” is “equivalently blameworthy to an actor who
intentionally pursues a course of conduct that the law has previously
described as fraud.”331
Buell’s argument is useful to this Article’s discussion of coercive
control for two reasons. In the first place, he gives reason to believe
that the adjudication process itself provides an ex post limitation on
which sorts of ambiguous conduct actually get punished for violating a
somewhat generally worded intent-based offense. His account of how
courts have cabined fraud suggests that even if a coercive control
offense contained somewhat broad conduct rules, there may be reason
to expect courts to serve a sorting function by only allowing cases to
proceed where the evidence suggests the defendant had awareness of
the wrongfulness of his conduct. The counterargument, of course, is
that “novel” fraud cases arise against the backdrop of a wellestablished common law offense, and we could not expect a brand-new
crime like coercive control to be enforced in such a principled way on
a case-by-case basis. Even accepting that objection, however, Buell’s
work urges thought about the importance of “consciousness of guilt”
as an ex ante element of the offense. His conclusions demonstrate that
the scienter element adds predictability to the treatment of evidence in
a potentially chaotic area of the law. The lack of such a requirement in
the U.K. coercive control offense is, therefore, one of its most
significant problems.
IV. TOWARD A COERCIVE CONTROL OFFENSE
This survey of offenses with similar structures, purposes, and
legality problems as coercive control provides a foundation for
legislatures to use in drafting a statute with the same policy goals as the
U.K. version, without creating an unconstitutional anomaly under
American law. It now remains to offer model statutory language that
is logically consistent with the legal justifications for the familiar

330. Id. at 1999–2000.
331. Id. at 1971, 2022–31.
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offenses discussed. After first presenting the model offense, this Part
will consider the evidentiary and policy objections that may still urge
against its adoption.
A. The Elements of the Offense
The following proposal improves upon the U.K. coercive control
offense by adopting a structure roughly similar to the crime of
conspiracy to commit fraud. Although this may seem like a
counterintuitive point of departure, conspiracy and fraud
jurisprudence, examined together, help resolve some of the
overbreadth and vagueness problems inherent in drafting a
nontransactional, coercive offense that encompasses nonviolent
interactions between two private parties.
Fraudulent speech itself is punishable because speech intrinsic to
committing the elements of an existing crime is not constitutionally
protected.332 Part III.D explained how even despite this general
principle blackmail has been the subject of significant critical debate
due to the fact that it appears to be a crime comprising solely legal
speech (for example, a verbal threat to make a verbal revelation).
Professor Stephen Galoob has defended blackmail on the unique
grounds that it functions as a kind of fraud.333 Each blackmail, he points
out, consists of two parts: the initial threat, which is coercive, and the
subsequent agreement.334 The agreement, he argues, is actually
fraudulent because it is unenforceable. According to Galoob, “Proving
criminal law charges of fraud usually requires showing that the
defendant has deceived the target, but deception matters mainly in
virtue of its connection to value.”335 Because the blackmailer’s
agreement not to reveal the information after being paid is
unenforceable, the victim of blackmail has entered into a valueless, and
thus fraudulent, exchange.336
Galoob’s account of blackmail illuminates the structure of
coercive control, which is similarly morally offensive but equally
difficult to translate into propositions of accepted criminal harm. Like
blackmail, coercive control is, naturally, part coercion. But to the

332. See Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949).
333. Stephen Galoob, Coercion, Fraud, and What Is Wrong with Blackmail, 22 LEGAL
THEORY 22, 22 (2016).
334. Id. at 34.
335. Id. at 35 (citation omitted).
336. Id. at 36–37.
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extent that it contains an agreement—“If you don’t do X, I will do Y,
or I will withhold Z”—it is just as fraudulent as the blackmailer’s
threat. In both cases—due, in one, to the unenforceability of the
blackmailer’s agreement and, in the other, to the ongoing, repetitive
pattern of behavior necessary to prove coercive control—the victim
receives nothing of value in return. The blackmailer can continue to
extort money because his victim has no legal recourse. And the
domestic abuser can continue to extract obedience, because—until the
moment he threatens physical violence—neither does his.
With those starting principles as a foundation, the basic model
offense is as follows:
A person is guilty of the crime of coercive control when they:
a) Continuously engage in a coercive pattern of behavior over a
substantial period of time with the intent to deprive another
person of their autonomy to make decisions and engage in
conduct to which they otherwise have the right; and
b) The two parties are spouses, intimate partners, or family
members; and
c) The pattern of behavior causes or creates a risk of nontrivial
economic, physical, mental, or emotional harm to the coerced
party.

The remainder of this Section will work through each of the
elements of this proposed offense to demonstrate how they use lessons
from other criminal offenses to resolve many of the problems of
legality and administrability identified in Part II of this Article as posed
by the U.K. statute.
1. “Continuously engage in a pattern of coercive behavior over a
substantial period of time.” The element of a “pattern of behavior” is
intentionally broad in order to capture the essence of coercive
control—and of domestic abuse generally—which is not
“transactional.”337 The U.K. commentators argued, as the motivating
policy behind the offense, that the core of domestic abuse is the
perpetrator’s “micro-regulation” of a victim’s day-to-day affairs, with
the ultimate goal of fully controlling them.338 This abuse may take the

337. See Bettinson & Bishop, supra note 46, at 9; Tuerkheimer, supra note 48, at 959–60.
338. See Tuerkheimer, supra note 48, at 963–65 & nn.3–7.
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form of words, actions, financial decisions, or a wide range of other
conduct it would be overly limiting to attempt to enumerate,
particularly given the context-specific importance of any individual
example of coercive behavior.339 Although the wording of this element
is open to criticism for being overly expansive, it is no less so than the
well-acknowledged “know-it-when-I-see-it” quality of fraud, remarked
upon above.340 Like fraud, coercive control must remain a flexible
enough concept to allow fact-finders to fit the law to complicated,
unforeseeable fact patterns. In both cases, the goal is for fact-finders to
determine whether one private party’s course of conduct toward
another crosses the line that separates the immoral from the criminal.
To avoid the potential for abuse, however, the proposed language
shares and exceeds the U.K. statute’s requirement that the coercive
behavior be ongoing, adding that it must occur over a “substantial
period of time.” Like the U.K. version, the offense attempts to avoid
punishing just any sort of technically coercive behavior within a
relationship, which could include the strategies of persuasion two
people with differing preferences engage in throughout the course of a
typical intimate relationship. The requirements of continuity and
longevity aim to target the sort of coercive conduct that fits a particular
sociological pattern: coercion that rises to the level of systematic abuse.
Criminalizing only such ongoing patterns of conduct—even where
individual instances within the pattern may be, in and of themselves,
perfectly legal—can be justified for the same reasons conspiracy law
justifies criminalizing verbal agreements to do things it is perfectly legal
to think about. If external agreement makes a “thought crime” both
more dangerous and easier to prove without violating due process, the
same can be said about an ongoing pattern of individually legal actions
geared toward the improper goal of depriving another person of
autonomy. The pattern, like the agreement, creates the danger—in the
case of coercive control, the danger is the well-documented risk of
repeated nonphysical coercion turning into physical, indeed lethal,
violence.
Further, this language addresses the somewhat limited case law on
emotional distress–based stalking offenses. In striking down portions
of their states’ stalking statutes, Illinois and Minnesota courts, at least,
have suggested that a coercion offense lacking an element of physical
339. Id. at 964–65.
340. See, e.g., Weiss v. United States, 122 F.2d 675, 681 (5th Cir. 1941).
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threat may raise constitutional overbreadth concerns.341 Unlike the
problematic Illinois stalking statute, which would criminalize
“knowingly threatening” someone two or more times when one should
know it would cause emotional distress, this model coercive control
offense requires a more frequent and lengthy series of behaviors.
Indeed, much like the stalking statute the Colorado Supreme Court
upheld, which also prohibited distressing “repeated” contact, an
offense prohibiting a lengthy pattern of behavior does not criminalize
“innocuous behavior,”342 particularly when combined with the other
elements of the offense.
2. “With the intent to deprive another person of their autonomy to
make decisions and engage in conduct to which they otherwise have the
right.” The specific intent element of the model offense is its sharpest
departure from the U.K. version—and also from existing state stalking
statutes and the proposal by Ortiz to make coercive control a form of
false imprisonment.343 All of those models criminalize intentional
conduct that recklessly or negligently creates a particular response in
the victim.344 This feature prevents defendants from arguing they were
unaware of the fact that their behavior made their victim feel
threatened, emotionally distressed, coerced, etc. Nonetheless, it is in
this lack of specific intent to bring about the state of coercion that
makes the U.K. coercive control offense difficult to defend against free
speech objections.
Due to the fraud-like aspects of coercive control, the law of fraud
may help narrow the scope of behavior, including communications,
that may properly be criminalized. As discussed in Part III.E, a
hallmark component of fraud is scienter. Not all misrepresentations
qualify as criminal, but the specific intent to defraud a victim brings
deceptive conduct into the ambit of the criminal law. Therefore, a
coercive control offense must include a specific intent element
analogous to scienter in fraud. The perpetrator must have the purpose
of using coercive behavior to extract unearned obedience from his
victim in exchange for nothing but more threats.
In addition to the legality problems the inclusion of a specific
intent element resolves, there is good reason to believe it will also

341.
342.
343.
344.

See discussion supra Part III.B.
People v. Cross, 127 P.3d 71, 78 (Colo. 2006) (en banc).
See supra Part III.B–C.
See supra Part III.B–C.
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resolve some of the problems of administrability likely to result from
the open texture of the “pattern of behavior” actus reus element. Buell
finds that courts deal with potentially open-ended fraud offenses by
allowing cases to proceed against defendants who demonstrate a
“consciousness of guilt” that their behavior runs afoul of prevailing
legal norms rejecting such behavior. For a coercive control offense to
effectively sort the clearly criminal cases of abuse from the ambiguous
ones, it must contain an element that allows courts and fact-finders to
weigh evidence of such “consciousness” on the side of conviction.
Without such an element the offense risks encouraging prosecutorial
exploitation.
3. “[S]pouses, intimate partners or family members.” This list of
potential victims is by no means exhaustive. The model offense
includes particular categories of victim to avoid some of the problems
that have arisen from the fact that Congress failed to specify which
sorts of service relationships gave rise to an “honest services fraud”
prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 1346. The list is intended to capture the
relationships most likely to create the risk of a permanent power
imbalance between intimate parties, but arguments could conceivably
be made for expanding or narrowing it. The role of coercive control in
human trafficking, for example, opens a whole new avenue of
inquiry.345
4. “Risk of nontrivial economic, physical, mental, or emotional
harm to the coerced party.” The model offense intentionally
incorporates an element equivalent to the “majority rule” in privatesector honest services fraud, which requires at least an objective risk of
reasonably foreseeable harm to the defrauded party. In adopting the
foreseeable harm standard in honest services fraud cases, the D.C.
Circuit noted that “the broadening of the scope of the statute to cover
intangible harms” urged that attention be paid to the outer limits of the
offense.346 Because many of the harms of coercive control are similarly
“intangible,” it is consistent with this precedent to incorporate the
more rigorous harm standard from the federal case law. Unlike in
honest services fraud cases, of course, the relevant risked harm will
only sometimes be economic, so the model statute also expands the list
345. See, e.g., Susie B. Baldwin, Anne E. Fehrenbacher & David P. Eisenman, Psychological
Coercion in Human Trafficking: An Application of Biderman’s Framework, 25 QUALITATIVE
HEALTH RES. 1171, 1177 (2015).
346. United States v. Lemire, 720 F.2d 1327, 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
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of cognizable potential harms to include all of those developed in the
sociological literature on coercive control. However, by not requiring
proof of injury-in-fact, the model statute focuses on abuser misconduct
rather than on forcing vulnerable victims to convince the fact-finder of
their victimization. Furthermore, the requirement that the threatened
harm be nontrivial serves to address the potential overbreadth
problems posed by inclusion of “intangible” harms. Such a limitation
excludes cases of mere annoyance and irritation and requires the factfinder to determine whether the nature of the coercive conduct poses
genuine psychological risk to the victim. In a world in which the justice
system is, if anything, overly punitive, the criminal law should only
expand to address nontrivial harms and evils.347
B. Policy Considerations
The model offense described above provides a theoretical basis
for criminalizing coercive control consistent with existing principles
that pass constitutional scrutiny in other areas of the criminal law. The
fact that a state could create this offense, however, does not of course
mean that it should. Simply limiting the offense in the manner this
Article proposes addresses some of the most obvious policy objections
to the U.K. version. The heightened mens rea requirement helps limit
the number of cases in which the offense can be said to occur, thereby
reducing the prospect of prosecutorial abuse and opportunism on the
part of would-be victims. At the same time, the shift in focus to abuser
conduct and risked harm, rather than injury-in-fact, will remove some
impediments to proving genuine cases of abuse.
Even with these improvements, any attempt to criminalize
behavior that arises in intimate settings runs the risk of creating
incentives for personal grievances to turn into criminal prosecutions.
Yet critics once made the same arguments about the criminal
prosecution of domestic assault348 and even “date” rape.349 The
experience in those areas warns that it is simply not a valid blanket
objection to punishing the serious abuse of an intimate partner to state
that angry wives and lovers could gain traction in their private disputes
by abusing the criminal law. That said, such a risk is necessarily

347. See DOUGLAS HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW
65–66 (2008).
348. See WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra note 21, at 332.
349. See generally Richard S. Orton, Date Rape: Critiquing the Critics, 31 J. SEX RES. 148
(1994) (discussing critiques of date rape prosecutions).
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uniquely high in the coercive control context, which seeks to punish
conduct that is not necessarily violent and at least sometimes ineffable.
This is, therefore, a real set of concerns any legislature should weigh
and measure against the equally real physical, psychological, and
economic harms the conduct causes its victims.
Another extremely important objection to criminalizing coercive
control relates less to its potentially unfair effect on defendants and
more to its potentially harmful effect on victims. Some feminist
scholars suggest that the effort to affix the label of criminality to sexual
and interpersonal encounters risks causing more and more women to
perceive themselves as victims where they would not otherwise have
done so had the law not intervened.350 For example, Professor Aya
Gruber criticizes the feminist critique of so-called “rape culture” for
formalizing a “trauma narrative” of rape in the context of campus
sex.351 The trauma narrative is “rife with other risks, including
bureaucratic management of students stripped of their subjectivity and
speech restrictions” and “construes sexual assault complainants as
devastated (or self-deluding) and female students as incapable of selfmanagement.”352 In short, she fears, “anti-rape culture repackages
feminist energy and female empowerment as sexual victimhood.”353
It is very easy to see how this risk might be even greater in cases
of nonviolent coercive control than in sexual assault, which at least
necessarily involves a physical act. Legislatures would need to balance
very carefully the risk of inscribing a narrative of official victimization
on any person whose partner engages in unpleasant behavior against
the risk of preventing the behavior at the point it crosses the line into
abuse. It is worth noting, however, that because my proposed statute
focuses on abuser misconduct rather than victim injury, it is less likely
to impose dignitary costs on victims by overemphasizing victim
narratives.
The most important objection to criminalizing coercive control is
the argument against expanding criminal law in any way: it opens the
door to overreaching and abuse in a way that would disproportionately
affect communities that already experience the harms of excessive
policing. The brutal shooting of twenty-six-year-old Louisville woman
350.
351.
352.
353.

Id. at 150.
Aya Gruber, Anti-Rape Culture, 64 KAN. L. REV. 1027, 1048–49 (2016).
Id. at 1048.
Id. at 1049.
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Breonna Taylor by a police officer executing a misdirected search
warrant in her apartment is only one recent high-profile example of the
dangers of licensing police incursion into the home.354 Indeed, a new
body of literature argues against achieving feminist goals through
criminalization, suggesting that exacerbating the punitiveness of the
criminal law will, among other ill effects, disproportionately affect
Black and other minority communities.355 Particularly relevant to the
heavily gendered case of domestic abuse, recent cultural commentary
argues that the trope of violated femininity has, throughout history,
been a weapon to justify police violence against Black men.356 Indeed,
many domestic violence activists fear that criminalizing coercive
control would exacerbate domestic violence because “[t]he legal
system is not something people always view as helpful to them, and that
can be related to an individual’s class and race and ethnicity and
immigration status.”357 The counterpoint to some of these concerns is
that the harms of domestic violence are, themselves,
disproportionately felt by women of color.358 Regardless of the
identities of the victims or the perpetrators, the project of criminalizing
coercive control should not occur in a vacuum, but only against a
backdrop of police reform geared toward eliminating structural racism

354. See Richard A. Oppel Jr., Derrick Bryson Taylor & Nicholas Bogel-Burroughs, What We
Know About Breonna Taylor’s Case and Death, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2020), https://nyti.ms/
3ez7ODt [https://perma.cc/6VQG-46DQ].
355. See, e.g., FRANCINE BANNER, CROWDSOURCING THE LAW: TRYING SEXUAL ASSAULT
ON SOCIAL MEDIA 184 (2019); AYA GRUBER, THE FEMINIST WAR ON CRIME: THE
UNEXPECTED ROLE OF WOMEN’S LIBERATION IN MASS INCARCERATION 7–14 (2020).
356. Charles M. Blow, How White Women Use Themselves as Instruments of Terror, N.Y.
TIMES (May 27, 2020), https://nyti.ms/2XEyvzJ [https://perma.cc/5VY20QN8D] (situating the
case of Amy Cooper, who told a Black man who had asked her to leash her dog that she was going
to call the police and tell them he was threatening her, in the historical context of rape as a
justification for lynching).
357. Nora Mabie, Coercive Control: It’s a Legal Term but Should It Be Criminalized?, SOC. JUST.
NEWS NEXUS (June 12, 2019, 2:49 PM), https://sjnnchicago.medill.northwestern.edu/blog/2019/06/
12/coercive-control-its-a-legal-term-but-should-it-be-criminalized [https://perma.cc/7D6F-GZZ2].
358. MICHELE C. BLACK, KATHLEEN C. BASILE, MATTHEW J. BREIDING, SHARON G.
SMITH, MIKEL L. WALTERS, MELISSA T. MERRICK, JIERU CHEN & MARK R. STEVENS, NAT’L
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, THE NATIONAL INTIMATE PARTNER AND
SEXUAL VIOLENCE SURVEY: 2010 SUMMARY REPORT 40 (2011), https://www.cdc.gov/
violenceprevention/pdf/nisvs_report2010-a.pdf [https://perma.cc/D8RB-9XKM] (reporting that
non-Hispanic Black and Native American/Alaska Native women reported higher prevalence
rates of lifetime interpersonal violence (43.7 percent and 46 percent, respectively) compared to
non-Hispanic White women (34.6 percent) and that the rate for Hispanic women was slightly
higher than for non-Hispanic White women (37.1 percent)).
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in police decisionmaking around use of force. Even beyond the
problems of structural racism, police departments should receive
training—as their counterparts in the United Kingdom have begun
to359—on de-escalation in the unique context of domestic violence.
Some promising examples already exist in the United States. Police
departments in Dallas and Houston have begun to deploy social
workers with police officers on certain calls.360 Camden, New Jersey
entirely reconstructed its police department along the principle that an
officer should no longer be the “arbitrary decider of what’s right and
wrong,” but “a facilitator and a convener.”361
Finally, legislatures would need to think about how the creation of
a domestic fraud-based coercive control offense would interact with
the affirmative defense of provocation. After all, the legal context of
the Sally Challen case, currently so important to the recent state of the
United Kingdom’s legal discourse on the subject, related to whether
the victim of coercive control should have some sort of duress defense
that would bump the killing of her controller down to manslaughter
from murder. If coercive control itself became a criminal offense,
would that qualify it as a source of “extreme mental or emotional
disturbance for which there is reasonable explanation or excuse”?362
The provocation doctrine, particularly the Model Penal Code’s broad
formulation, has been criticized for intrinsic sexism, to the extent that
it appears to partially excuse the rage-based killings often associated
with male violence.363 Should the law come to recognize coercive
control as a basis for provocation, it would seem to restore some
symmetry to that beleaguered doctrine, though perhaps at the risk of
encouraging violent self-help. These questions provide new directions
for future research.
359. Updated Training Improves Police Understanding of Coercive Control, COLL. POLICING,
https://www.college.police.uk/News/archive/september_2017/Pages/Updated_training_improves_
police_understanding_of_coercive_control.aspx [https://perma.cc/24Q6-F2MG].
360. Julian Gill & Hannah Dellinger, ‘The Wave of the Future’: How Police and Social
Workers Team Up To Help Those in Crisis, HOUS. CHRONICLE (July 9, 2020), https://
www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/Social-workers-partner-withHouston-police-for-15397543.php [https://perma.cc/ED84-WGG6]; Lucas Manfield, Dallas Has
Been Dispatching Social Workers to Some 911 Calls. It’s Working, DALL. OBSERVER (Dec. 10,
2019, 4:00 AM), https://www.dallasobserver.com/news/dallas-has-been-dispatching-socialworkers-to-some-911-calls-its-working-11810019 [https://perma.cc/3CGD-GG2C].
361. Katherine Landergan, The City That Really Did Abolish the Police, POLITICO (June 12,
2020, 4:30 AM), https://politi.co/3hmWRY7 [https://perma.cc/65W2-KANU].
362. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (AM. L. INST. 1985).
363. See, e.g., Victoria Nourse, Passion’s Progress: Modern Law Reform and the Provocation
Defense, 106 YALE L.J. 1331, 1335 (1997).
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CONCLUSION
This Article has advanced two claims, one explicit and one
implicit. At the blackletter level, it has presented a model for thinking
about coercive control using the doctrinal tools of criminal fraud and
other offenses. The statutory solution proposed here is far from
perfect, in part because any attempt to criminalize harmful conduct as
wide-ranging and open to prosecutorial interpretation as coercive
control is going to sit in tension with the basic rule of law. However,
the proposed model statute has the advantage of harmony with other
long-standing legal doctrines, as opposed to creating a brand-new,
open-ended crime from whole cloth. This is particularly important as
other “newer” statutory offenses, such as emotional child or elder
abuse, stalking, and cyberbullying, continue to face due process
objections, in addition to enforcement challenges.
As a few states have begun to show interest in criminalizing
coercive control, this exercise also demonstrates that legal reformers
who seek to use society’s increased understanding of the sociological
reality of gender-based harm may be better served not to create
specialized offenses to address it. Although the criminal law may be a
blunt tool for dealing with such complex problems as coercive control,
using existing doctrines not only assures constitutionality—it prevents
public perception of the offense as something less than a true crime.
Conversely, a legal system that already punishes harmful immoral
coercion in commercial settings through offenses like fraud would be
more internally consistent if it accounted for equally harmful coercion
in domestic settings. Integrating these bodies of law strengthens the
legal foundations of both.

